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ABSTRACT 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is the fastest growing investment trend in the world and it 
has been extensively studied in the past decades. Most scholars have studied the phenomenon 
in the context of the modern portfolio theory, some have sought different approaches. 
However a vast majority of the studies have concentrated on professionally managed funds 
and indices. For this study the socially responsible portfolios are created on purely ethical 
grounds by disregarding all financial indicators. The practice of social screening is also 
inspected thoroughly in order to find out at which point the screening stringency starts to limit 
the performance of the investment. 
 
The effect of social screening is studied though a set of socially responsible portfolios. The 
portfolios are based on a company specific ethical score which is provided by Covalence, an 
independent Swiss research company. The portfolios are constructed so that they reflect 
different levels of screening stringency. The portfolios are then subjected to performance 
analysis, more specifically risk and return indicators, regression analysis and risk-adjusted 
performance metrics. The effect of industries is also investigated. The observation period is 
divided into distinctive periods in terms of market cycles in order to find out whether the 
results differ in bull and bear markets. 
 
The results are very much consistent with previous studies in the bull market. Although some 
SRI portfolios performed better than the market based on risk-adjusted metrics, none of the 
results were significant. However the unethical companies were able to beat the market with 
significance. Overall the results from period 1 support prior evidence. However there are some 
anomalies which occur in the midst of the financial crisis in period 2. All portfolios seem to 
behave differently in terms of SMB and HML –factors of the Fama-French model. None of the 
regression coefficient proved significant but the worst performers of period 1 seemed to be 
the best in period 2. The industries do not seem to have important effect, though the ones 
which have low ethical scores have also the lowest correlation with SRI portfolios. The results 
also conclusively indicate that after a certain point the level of risk rises at an accelerating rate 
when more screening is imposed. Nonetheless the empirical evidence indicates that SRI should 
not lead to a direct performance penalty, and should therefore be regarded as a viable option 
for any investor. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Socially Responsible investing, Social Screening, Portfolio Performance, Economic 
Cycles.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the past decades the world has undergone remarkable developments in 
technology, distribution of information and globalization, just to mention a few. This 
has consequently led to a growing social awareness for people, which in turn has 
affected all aspects of the modern society. Even the quintessential purpose of a 
company is questioned. Investors in growing numbers have started taking social 
responsibility into account when making investment decisions, although, from a 
theoretical perspective, this is considered irrational behavior. Today socially 
responsible investing (SRI) is the fastest growing investment trend in the world. The 
Social Investment Forum (2010) estimates that in the United States roughly 12.2 
percent of assets under professional management, are now involved in SRI. In other 
words, nearly one out of every eight dollars is invested in a socially responsible 
manner. Although there is no single minded determination of what is considered 
socially responsible investing, it can roughly be defined as an investment process that 
integrates personal values and societal concerns into decision-making. 
 
Socially responsible investing, however, is not a form of philanthropy. The most 
common form of socially responsible investing is social screening in which possible 
investment opportunities are valued according to their positive and negative effects in 
respect to social responsibility. The premise of SRI is that investors do no longer need 
to separate good fortune from good will. However, the problem often associated with 
SRI is that in theory it should be financially disadvantageous for investors. The reason 
for this lies in the restricted universe of investment opportunities. According to the 
modern portfolio theory, any limitation in absolute diversification leads to a 
suboptimal portfolio. Therefore the best possible risk-return relationship can never be 
achieved. (Markowitz 1952.) Other theories imply that social responsibility can give a 
company competitive advantage, which would evidently have a positive effect on stock 
performance (Wagner, Schaltegger & Wehrmeyer 2001). Arbitrage pricing theorists 
suggest that the suboptimal portfolio can be corrected if the factor sensitivities are 
adjusted to correspond to those of the benchmark. In other words modern 
quantitative tools allow investors to change the composition of nearly any investment 
portfolio so that its movements mimic a selected benchmark. (Roll & Ross 1980; Kurtz 
2005.) One other concern regarding socially responsible investing is towards the 
screening process itself. The use of exclusionary screens is questioned because many 
of the excluded companies and industries have special characteristics that may have an 
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appreciating effect on stock returns. Due to their unethical reputation they also tend 
to suffer from neglect by several marker participants, which may cause them to be 
undervalued. (Merton 1987; Hong & Kacperczyk 2009.) Due to a somewhat 
interdisciplinary nature of the social screening process, it has also provoked conceptual 
and methodological scrutiny by scholars and investment professionals. 
 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon has been widely investigated since the early 90’s from 
several different perspectives. Although there has been dispersion in the findings, the 
most common outcome suggests that socially responsible investing should not lead to 
performance penalty, nor should it produce higher than average returns (e.g. 
Hamilton, Jo & Statman 1993; Sauer 1997; Lobe, Rothmeier & Walkshäusl 2009). This 
conflict between theory and practice has intrigued scholars and many have attempted 
to find out why it is so.  Several studies reveal that SRI portfolios are tilted towards 
growth stocks and empirical evidence suggest that value stock tend to outperform 
growth stocks in the long run. Abramson & Chung (2000) were able to demonstrate 
that a value subset of socially responsible stocks was able to outperform the market. 
Also the selected approach on social screening seems to have an effect. Screening out 
unethical or “sin” stocks tends to have a depreciating effect on the portfolio (Hong & 
Kacperczyk 2009; Kim & Venkatachalam 2006), while picking out strong ethical 
performers seems to boost the portfolio performance (Barnett & Salomon 2006; 
Statman & Glushkov 2009). The overview of these studies along with other related 
literature is presented in Chapter 4. Altogether, socially responsible investing is a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon and this study attempts to approach it from a new 
and fresh perspective.  
1.1 Motivation  
Socially responsible investing has become the fastest growing trend in investing, 
especially in the US, and the phenomenon has been extensively studied during the last 
two decades. Most of the studies have examined the performance of professionally 
managed funds and indices. However professionally managed funds always take 
financial aspects into consideration. Many indices, then again, select companies using 
“best in class” ratings, which means that for instance tobacco and alcohol companies 
may be accepted in the index if they have reputable CSR-standards. Therefore neither 
of them show the performance of companies selected on purely ethical grounds.  
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The premise for this study is the article Answers to Four Questions (2005) by Lloyd 
Kurtz, where he discusses different issues regarding socially responsible investing. 
Among other things Kurtz hypothesizes in his article that the more stringent the social 
screens are, the greater the tracking error will become. The expected relationship 
between screening stringency and tracking error is visualized in figure 1 For investors it 
would be important to find out at which point the degree of tracking error per unit of 
social stringency begins to accelerate (Point A). Kurtz also notes that such a study has 
not yet been conducted.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Notional Impact of Stringency on Tracking Error. (Kurtz 2005) 
 
 
Studying the effects of screening stringency is evidently the primary basis for the 
study, but there are also other issues that have been partly neglected in the field of 
socially responsible investing. Copp, Kremmer and Roca (2010) find that SRI-indices 
outperformed their benchmarks in a downturn although they became riskier. 
Interestingly enough Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) find that also unethical investments 
perform exceptionally well in downturns, but other than these finding, there is little 
empirical evidence on the matter. Therefore the relationship between market cycles 
and SRI is another point of interest in the study. Equally the effect of industries on SRI 
has been disregarded in prior literature. It would be interesting to find out how 
sensitive SRI portfolios are with respect to different industries and how ethical these 
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industries are. Combining these elements we may find new and relevant information 
regarding the field of socially responsible investing. 
1.2 The purpose of the study and research hypotheses 
The fundamental purpose of the study is to investigate the performance of portfolios 
selected on purely ethical grounds by disregarding all financial indicators. The 
performance of the portfolios is measured with different indicators starting from the 
underlying elements of risk and return. Screening plays also an important role in the 
study, therefore several socially responsible portfolios are constructed to reflect 
different levels of screening stringency. The objective for this approach is the attempt 
to find out how much screening effects the risk and return of a portfolio and at which 
point the lack of diversification becomes unbearable for an investor. Also an unethical 
portfolio is constructed to monitor the possible effects of negative screening and the 
performance of an opposing investment strategy. In order to further extend the study, 
socially responsible standings of different industries and the possible industry-related 
sensitivities of the portfolios are also investigated. 
 
The study is limited to cover the US stock market for a period of 9 years. The ethical 
scores, which are the basis for the portfolios, are provided by Covalence, an 
independent Swiss research company. The data directly imposes some restrictions on 
the study. The ethical reputation score is available from 2002 onwards, therefore the 
time period for the study extends from 2002 to 2010. The period is then divided into 
two sub-periods to characterize different market cycles. The total sample provided by 
Covalence consists of nearly 600 multinational companies from all over the world. 
However, only the 240 companies based in the United States are selected from the 
sample. The stock market data for the selected companies does not fully correspond to 
the data provided by Covalence, therefore the final sample consists of 236 US 
companies. The applied research methods have been selected due to their popularity 
and functionality in similar studies. It was also decided to limit the study only to the 
stock market performance and not to include performance figures from the balance 
sheet and income statement. 
 
The hypotheses are formulated from financial theory and previous empirical findings 
regarding socially responsible investing. The first research hypothesis regarding SRI 
performance has two dimensions, theoretical and empirical. From a theoretical 
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perspective social screening limits the universe of possible investments and it 
therefore should have a depreciating effect on the portfolio performance. Hence, 
based on the modern portfolio theory the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
   : Socially responsible investments underperform in comparison to the 
market and other well diversified portfolios. 
 
However a vast majority of studies that have studied SRI suggest that such 
underperformance does not occur. Therefore based on the empirical evidence the 
alternative hypothesis is as follows: 
 
   : The performance of socially responsible investments does not differ from 
the performance of conventional investments. 
 
The second hypothesis is derived from Kurtz’s (2005) reflections on the notional 
impact of screening stringency on tracking error. However, there are several ways to 
indicate the riskiness of a portfolio. From the perspective of the modern portfolio 
theory, the volatility of a portfolio is important risk factor. Inadequate diversification 
should particularly impact the riskiness of a portfolio, hence, the second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
  : An intensifying screening stringency leads to a greater level of portfolio risk 
 
The third hypothesis is linked to the undesirable implications of exclusionary screening. 
Kim and Venkatachalam (2006) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) discovered that a 
portfolio consisting of “sin” stocks outperforms the market. Although the approach in 
constructing the unethical portfolio differs from previous studies, we may assume that 
portfolio companies suffer from the same market neglect, which is supposedly the 
attribute for excess returns. 
 
  : The unethical portfolio outperforms the market.  
 
The fourth hypothesis is related to the relationship between SRI portfolios and 
industries. This connection has not been studied before, therefore the hypothesis 
cannot be directly derived from empirical evidence. Certainly there will be differences 
in how well different industries perform on ethical grounds. Specific industries such as 
tobacco, alcohol and weapons industries will undoubtedly be subjected to negative 
media exposure, which evidently effects their ethical reputation. However when it 
comes to broader industry specifications, it will be interesting to find which ones stand 
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out for better and for worse and how they correlate with SRI portfolios. From this 
stand point we can draw the last hypothesis: 
 
  : Industries with poor ethical scores have a lower correlation with SRI 
portfolios 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is comprised of two major parts including a theoretical and an empirical. 
The first Chapter presents a brief description of the topic and lays out the research 
problem. In Chapter 2, the phenomenon of socially responsible investing is introduced. 
The concept of screening is more thoroughly presented due to its importance 
regarding the study. Chapter 3 provides an insight to the theoretical background 
concerning socially responsible investing. In order to cover the background for the 
research, important studies that have been previously conducted on this field of 
studies are presented in Chapter 4.  The empirical part of the study starts in Chapter 5 
with a description of the data and how it has been utilized. Chapter 6 describes the 
selected empirical methods with detail. In chapter 7, findings of the thesis are 
discussed with rigor and the hypotheses are either rejected or accepted. Finally 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and concludes with suggestions for further 
research.   
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
 
Social investment forum (2005), the most prominent nonprofit membership 
association dedicated to advancing the practice and growth of socially responsible 
investing describes socially responsible investing as “an investment process that 
considers the social and environmental consequences of investments, both positive 
and negative, within the context of rigorous financial analysis.” Steve Schueth (2003) 
defines SRI as “the process of integrating personal values and societal concerns into 
investment decision-making”. (Social Investment Forum 2005; Schueth 2003; Kurtz 
2005.) 
 
Although many critics of SRI believe it to be a passing fad, it has not faded during the 
latest recession. The fact is that it gained popularity with both institutional and 
individual investors. In part, this may be due to the outperformance of professionally 
managed SRI investments compared to conventional ones.  During 2008 – 2009 S&P 
companies had a fairly flat growth while SRI assets grew by 13%. Not only did their 
performance remain steady, the asset size also grew and more money managers 
started adopting SRI approaches. Social investment forum (SIF) indicates that the value 
of assets under management directed to SRI grew from 2,7 trillion in 2006 to 3,1 
trillion by then end of 2009. Although SRI has traditionally had a strong involvement in 
Public Pension Funds and Mutual Funds, also Exchange Traded Funds (ETF), which are 
currently the fastest growing area of all investment vehicles, have started adopting SRI 
standards. (Boerner 2011.) 
 
In this Chapter we will take a closer look at socially responsible investing. First the 
origins of the phenomenon are investigated from the first known socially responsible 
investments until the immense growth of the last decades. The different strategies 
regarding SRI are presented next, but the focus is on one particular strategy. The 
practice of screening is not only the most common SRI strategy, but also directly linked 
to the empirical part of the study. The screens are divided into negative (or 
exclusionary) screens and positive (or qualitative) screens, but also future screens are 
discussed. Evidently socially responsible investing has not only received praise due to 
its somewhat indistinct concept. For this reason it is also important to present the 
conceptual and methodological criticism it has faced from scholars and professionals. 
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2.1 Origins of Socially Responsible Investing 
In order to fully understand the current state of socially responsible investing, one 
must look into the origins of the phenomenon. The first appearance of socially 
responsible investing dates back to early biblical times and was strongly linked to 
religious traditions, morals and ethics. Religious investors from Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic faiths and many indigenous cultures, whose traditions embrace peace and 
nonviolence, have avoided investing in enterprises that profit from products designed 
to kill or enslave other human beings. Jewish law even laid down directives on ethical 
investing. The Methodist and Quaker immigrants in the US started to manage money 
using what are now referred to as social screens. The religious origins of SRI can still be 
seen in the widespread avoidance of “sin stocks”, which among others include 
companies in the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries. Pioneer Fund is believed to 
be the first investment to use negative screens in the United States, it was established 
in 1928. (Social Investment Forum 2005; Schueth 2003; Schwartz 2003.) 
 
The modern roots of SRI are closely linked to major changes in society in the last third 
of the century and follow the growth of key social movements for the environment, 
human rights and animal rights. The political climate in the late 60’s was in turmoil and 
many societal concerns were raised up in the process, among these were the anti-
Vietnam war movement, civil rights movement, concerns about the cold war, equality 
for women, management and labor issues and anti-nuclear sentiment. As social 
responsibility became an issue, in 1969 the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) began 
rating companies on their social and environmental performance. In 1971 the first SRI 
fund, the Pax World Fund, was set up in response to the demand for investments 
which did not benefit from the Vietnam War. Responding to an increasing concern 
about environmental issues after the catastrophes of Chernobyl, Bhopal and Exxon 
Valdez, a new breed of “green” SRI’s started to emerge. Meanwhile other forms for 
socially responsible investment were created. Shareholder advocates turned to proxy-
resolution process to bring up issues at company meetings and Mercury Provident was 
set up as the first bank designated to lend to projects with a social benefit. Lately the 
anti-apartheid movement, school killings, human rights and healthy working conditions 
in globalizing industries and the growing concern about climate change have all raised 
interest towards socially responsible investing. (Social Investment Forum 2005; 
Shepherd 2000; Schueth 2003.) 
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Although SRI has been slowly raising its head during the last five decades the most 
important change from margin to mainstream happened by the passing of the new 
millennia. Several elements have been presented as key factors to the robust growth 
of SRI (Sparkes & Cowton 2004). The possibilities for socially responsible investing have 
grown with the coming of new products and fund styles. Money managers have 
increasingly started to incorporate social and environmental factors into their investing 
practices. This may be due to the fact that investors are better educated and informed 
today than at any other time before. The better-informed investors are, the more 
responsible their actions tend to be. The latest economic trends have brought women 
to manage investment decisions and the social investment industry calculates that 
roughly 60 percent of socially conscious investors are women. Also unit trusts, pension 
funds and insurance companies who tend to invest in a socially responsible manner 
have significantly increased their share ownership. Importantly a growing number of 
evidence supports the notion that investors no longer need to separate good fortune 
from good will. (Shepherd 2000; Social Investment Forum 2007; Schueth 2003.) 
 
Due to the sudden growth of SRI, institutional investors find themselves in a position 
leading to a new form of SRI shareholder pressure. Investing in corporations that 
comply with specific ethical standards gives incentive for other companies to review 
their policies. The current trend has an ongoing disciplinary effect on companies due to 
the fact that if they do not take social responsibility issues into consideration, they 
make themselves less attractive to a growing number of investors. This observation 
has made investors thinking what possible implications negative screening may have 
on the portfolio performance. (Crane & Matten 2007: p 253.) 
 
The inception of Vice Fund in 2002 started the emergence of unethical investing.  
Unethical investing can broadly be defined as the inverted use of negative screens, 
which would be excluded in SRI.  As its counterpart, the standard for what constitutes 
vice changes over time and among societies and cultures. The definition of what 
constitutes a controversial industry is itself controversial. However the most 
acknowledged base of unethical industries today is the so called “Triumvirate of Sin”, it 
includes alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries. Social responsible investors choose to 
invest in ways that support and encourage improvements in quality of life while 
pursuing financial goals. Unethical investing on the other hand is restricted to a unique 
subset of investors who are willing to bear a social cost. (Visaltanatchoti, Zou & Zheng 
2009; Schueth 2003.) 
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2.2 SRI Strategies 
 
There are three universally acknowledged strategies for socially responsible investing. 
The most common is social screening which will be more thoroughly addressed below. 
Another commonly used strategy is shareholder advocacy. One potential lever for 
socially aware investors with which to make corporations accountable is to buy shares 
of that company with a main objective to make positive use of the rights of 
shareholder democracy.  Shareholder advocacy involves actions many social investors 
take in their role as owners of companies. These actions include engaging in dialogue 
with companies on issues of concern as well as submitting and voting proxy 
resolutions. Proxy resolutions generally aim to improve corporate behavior and 
enhance the well being of all the company’s stakeholders all while promoting long-
term shareholder value and financial performance. (Crane & Matten 2007: 247; Social 
Investment Forum 2005; Schueth 2003.) 
 
There are three basic types of shareholder resolutions. Social responsibility resolutions 
address issues concerning company policies, practices and actions when it comes to 
questions on e.g. environment, health and safety, equal employment opportunity, 
labor standards, military and defense contracting, corporate political contributions, 
sustainability, tobacco, and animal welfare. Corporate governance resolutions focus on 
how the company is governed when it comes to questions on calls for majority 
elections of the board, proxy voting policies, independent board chairs, separation of 
the CEO and chair, limitations on consulting by auditors, expensing stock options and 
awarding performance-based options, restricting executive compensation, and 
repealing classified boards and takeover provisions. Crossover proposals include 
resolutions overlapping the two, they address issues such as board diversity and 
executive pay tied to social benchmarks. (Social Investment Forum 2005.) 
 
The third strategy is community investing. Social investing can be roughly divided into 
two main sub-classes, the first being socially responsible investing (SRI) and the other 
socially directed investing, which occurs when investors voluntarily accept lower 
returns for community development or other purposes. Community investing provides 
capital to low-income communities that are underserved by conventional financial 
services. Social investors tend to earmark a percentage of their investments to 
community investment institutions with missions focused on providing financial 
services to disadvantaged communities and to supply capital for small businesses and 
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important community services, such as affordable housing, child care and healthcare. 
(Social Investment Forum 2005; Schueth 2003; Sparkes 2001.) 
 
There is a wide range of different institutions and initiatives focused on community 
development, but they can be divided into four primary types. Community 
development banks focus their lending on rebuilding disadvantaged communities, but 
also offer conventional bank services. Community development credit unions are 
membership owned and nonprofit institutions that offer financial services to people 
and communities that have limited access to conventional credit unions. Community 
development loan funds pool investments and loans provided by individuals and 
institutions to make or guarantee loans to small businesses, affordable housing 
developments, and community service organizations in specific geographic areas. 
Community development venture capital funds focus investing in highly competitive 
small businesses that have the potential for rapid growth in certain geographic areas, 
while creating jobs, entrepreneurial capacity, and wealth. (Social Investment Forum 
2005.) 
2.3 Screening 
Screening or social screening is basically the practice of evaluating investments on 
corporate governance, social, ethical, environmental and other criteria. Investors 
choose to include or exclude companies from their portfolios based on a specific set of 
standards. Usually investors seek to own companies that not only make a positive 
contribution, but also perform well. Screens can also be used as filters to identify 
managerial competence and superior corporate governance. The practice of screening 
is often divided into two types of screens, exclusionary or negative screens and 
qualitative or positive screens. (Schueth 2003; Schwartz 2003.) 
 
Investors using negative screening avoid investing in companies whose products and 
business practices are harmful. Conversely, investors using positive screens seek out 
companies with outstanding corporate social responsibility. The evolution of screening 
practices over time closely reflects the change in social investors as well. The major 
change has been the idea of moving from avoidance to the promotion of corporate 
social responsibility and stronger corporate citizenship while also creating wealth for 
companies, shareholders and communities.  Negative screens, due to their historical 
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background are often referred to as the first generation of SRI screens, positive screens 
are naturally the second generation of screens. Modern screening tends to take into 
account economic, environmental and social criteria comprised by both negative and 
positive screens. This kind of integrated approach is also known as the third generation 
of screening. The fourth generation combines prior screening practices with 
shareholder activism. (Social Investment Forum 2005; Renneboog et al. 2008.) 
2.3.1 Negative screening 
The practice of negative screening is the oldest and most basic strategy of SRI. The 
practice of negative screening usually means that specific stocks or industries are 
excluded from the portfolio based on selected criteria. Traditionally socially conscious 
investors have screened out companies involved in alcohol and gambling, the so-called 
sin stocks, most investor label also tobacco as a sin stock. Social Investment Forum 
(2005) reports that still more than half of all screened funds screen out these stocks. 
Other commonly used negative screens include defense and weapons industry, 
environmental issues, poor labor relations, poor consumer-product safety, unequal 
employment opportunities, animal rights violations and pornography. (Social 
Investment Forum 2005; Crane & Matten 2007: 251; Renneboog et al. 2008.) 
 
Due to globalization SRI investors have been forced to look beyond the domestic 
corporate social responsibility. New times have created new kinds of negative screens 
which include negative community impact, child labor, companies producing or trading 
with oppressive regimes, environmentally hazardous products or processes and human 
rights violations (Crane & Matten 2007, p 251). Not only do the companies have to 
keep track of their own actions, they also need to stipulate them from their partners 
and subcontractors. Some investors choose to exclude companies that are directly 
involved in unethical sectors or they screen them out if their revenues from unethical 
activities exceed a predetermined threshold. However, there are also investors who 
apply negative screens to the branches and suppliers of the underlying companies. For 
instance some SRI investors have screened out companies doing business in countries 
with poor labor standards and human rights or where conflict, civil strife, terrorism, or 
pandemic diseases are daily realities of the business climate. (Social Investment Forum 
2005; Renneboog et al. 2008.) 
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The evolution of negative screening has been very dynamic. Investors have elaborated 
a new generation of screens to address changes in society, and more exclusionary 
screens will evolve together with the society. In part due to this, some negative 
screening criteria do not share a coherent alignment. Genetic engineering, 
biotechnology and nuclear power might have had a negative reputation due to 
historical safety concerns, but are not necessarily viewed by all as negative screens 
today. Also political views and social awareness are increasingly taken into account in 
screening. For instance investors might be concerned about the unequal distribution of 
wealth, and therefore screen out companies with excessive executive compensation. 
(Crane & Matten 2007: 251; Kinder and Domini, 1997.) Some investments are directed 
to investors with strong ideological or religious convictions. These investors may 
choose to screen out e.g. companies affiliated with abortion, youth concerns or anti-
family entertainment and lifestyle. Islamic investments tend to exclude firms 
producing pork products and some Christian investors avoid investing in insurance 
companies insuring non-married people. These kinds of screens can be found for 
nearly any religion or sect, including Lutheran, Christian Scientist, Catholic, Islamic, 
Mennonite, Judeo-Christian, fundamentalist Christian, and Mormon. (Social 
Investment Forum 2005; Renneboog et al. 2008; Schwartz 2003.) 
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Table 1. Typical positive and negative screens and their application by known SRI funds 
and indices. (USSIF 2011.) 
 
  
Domini 
social Index 
Calvert 
Social Index 
Parnassus 
Fund  
Ariel Fund 
          
Environment         
Climate and Clean Technologies P P P - 
Pollution and Toxics P P P - 
Environment and Other P P P P 
          
Social         
Community Development P P P P 
Divesity & Equal Employment Opportunity P P P P 
Human Rights P R P - 
Labor Relations P P P - 
          
Governance         
Board Issues P P P P 
Executive Pay - P P - 
          
Products         
Alcohol X R R - 
Animal Testing R R R - 
Defense/Weapons X R R X 
Gambling X R R - 
Tobacco X R R X 
          
 P : Positive Investment, seeks investments with positive impact in this area  R : Restricted Investment, seeks to avoid poorer performers in this area 
 X :  No Investment, excludes investments engaged in this activity  - : No Screens, does not screen investments in this area   
2.3.2 Positive screening 
Evaluating the ethical performance of companies is very different from simple 
exclusionary screening.  The qualitative evaluation of a company's performance poses 
a much more difficult challenge and requires extensive resources. Positive screening is 
directly linked with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and focuses in finding 
companies that actively engage in creating a positive impact. When selecting 
companies through qualitative screening, usually the emphasis is on selecting 
companies with strong CSR standards. The most common positive screens focus on 
corporate governance, good employer-employee and labor relations, strong 
environmental practices, sustainability of investments and product quality and safety 
issues. Positive screens are also frequently used to select companies with a good 
record concerning equal opportunities and ethical employment practices, public 
transport, inner city renovation and community development programs and green 
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technologies, such as renewable energy usage. In a globalizing business environment 
qualitative screening criteria may also include the impact of offshore operations, the 
respect for human rights around the world and the stimulation of cultural diversity. 
(Social Investment Forum 2005; Renneboog et al. 2008; Kinder & Domini 1997.) 
 
Qualitative screens usually rely on different indicators from which broad conclusions 
about a company may be drawn. These indicators should measure all aspects of 
corporate performance that should concern the investor and point out areas of 
strength. Alternatively the same indicators can be used to identify poor performers. 
The problem incidental to the use of these kinds of indicators is that someone must 
evaluate the company's record and make judgment on it. They lack the virtue of simple 
exclusionary screens. This aspect of positive screening is, among others, scrutinized in 
the next sub-chapter. The use of qualitative screens is sometimes combined with a 
“best in class” approach in which companies are ranked within their specific industry 
or market sector based on CSR criteria. To some extent this might be in contrast with 
exclusionary screening if they are not applied together. Nevertheless qualitative 
screening has become an essential part of SRI investment practices. (Kinder & Domini 
1997; Renneboog et al. 2008.) 
 
Social investors are well aware that there are no perfect companies, consequently the 
qualitative screening process generally seeks only to identify better-managed 
companies. The attained results steer towards a portfolio that meets a certain social 
criteria, but it always comes up to the personal choices of the investors, therefore 
screening decisions are never black and white.  Positive screening, however, requires 
an enormous amount of qualitative analysis of corporate policies, practices, attitudes 
and impact on top of the traditional quantitative determination of profit potential. Due 
to this many social investors have turned to organizations providing independent 
research on the environmental, social, governance (ESG) and ethical performance of 
companies. (Schueth 2003; EIRIS 2009.) 
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2.3.3 Future screens 
 
Most of the screens applied today attempt to capture a more nuanced sentiment of 
corporate performance and therefore both positive and negative screens are applied. 
So far the changes in society, overall awareness and prevalent values have dictated the 
evolution of social screening. It is, nonetheless, safe to say that the range of the 
current qualitative screens will expand. The emerging qualitative will focus primarily 
on offshore corporate activity, screens regarding global issues will most likely increase 
due to the globalization of business and the increasing popularity of mutual funds with 
global exposure. Also the number of different environmental screens will rise as 
investors become distressed by global warming and local concerns. Land use issues 
may also be an important screening area in the future, given the ever rising population 
in some urban and urbanizing areas. (Kinder & Domini 1997.) 
 
Diversity issues will gradually emerge as the demographics of the American workplace 
is transforming both in terms of ethnicity and age. Workplace justice will therefore 
surely be one of the future social screens. Company policies will also determine future 
screens. Investors will pay more to employee relations attention, already excesses 
executive compensation, outsourcing or job exporting are a point of concern. The 
organized labor’s increasing interest in social investing by will most likely accelerate 
this trend. Needless to say that unpredictable events will determine the future of 
social screening but it is also safe to expect that conventional securities analysis will 
take into account more social screens in the future. (Kinder & Domini 1997.) 
2.4 SRI criticism 
Expectedly socially responsible investing has also faced criticism from scholars and 
investment professionals alike. The theoretical concerns will be addressed Chapter 3, 
but there are also other issues regarding socially responsible investing that face 
opposition. Some concepts of SRI are believed to be too obscure of confusing and the 
absence of the very definition of SRI criticized. The methodology behind SRI is another 
point of concern. Opponents of SRI believe that addressing social issues together with 
financial issues is problematic and inevitably leads to biased and questionable research 
and decision-making methods. 
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2.4.1 Conceptual Issues 
The very definition of socially responsible investing has been subjected to a lot of 
controversy and scrutiny. Socially responsible investment and ethical investment are 
generally thought to be equivalent terms, but one might argue whether this should be 
the case. Lately the term “ethical investment” has increasingly been replaced by that 
of “socially responsible investment”. This may in parts be due to the fact that people 
might feel uncomfortable using the word “ethical” in terms of investment matters. 
(Sparkes & Cowton 2004.)  Although Socially Responsible Investing or its abbreviation 
SRI is the most common term, intriguingly scholars use a variance of other semantic 
definitions. These definitions include mission-based investing, mission-related 
investing, social investing, socially aware investing, socially conscious investing, green 
investing and values-based investing. These terms are often used interchangeably and 
all refer to an investing approach that integrates social and environmental concerns 
into investment decisions. However many disagree with these terms. SRI seems to be 
the preferred term in the United States, but Europeans tend to use the terms 
sustainable investing and green investing. The term socially responsible investing can 
also give the impression that unscreened portfolios are irresponsible, therefore other 
alternatives include terms such as guideline investing, screened investing and natural 
investing. (Social Investment Forum 2005; Schueth 2003; Kurtz 2005.) 
 
The views of social responsibility and ethics differ between culture differences and 
even on a personal level which poses a problem on screened investment products such 
as portfolios, funds and indices. Defining an ethical fund may be impossible due to the 
fact that there is no single accepted body of ethics and the difficulty of fitting a 
personal ethical spectrum to discrete portfolio choices results to a widely diverse 
composition of ethical investment products. The problem becomes clear when 
legislation is involved, for instance all UK private sector pension funds have been 
legally obliged to consider socially responsible investments as part of their overall 
investment policy. However the government regulations make no attempt to define 
what the required social, environmental or ethical considerations might be. Even the 
ethical fund sector cannot provide a comprehensive definition of what an ethical 
business is. Hogget & Nahan (2002) argue that the lack of a shared definition of SRI 
makes it possible to address nearly any investment product as ethical, sustainable or 
responsible. The absence of an agreed definition of SRI is the most controversial issue 
regarding this area of studies. (Sparkes 2001; Hoggett & Nahan 2002.) 
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Schwartz, in his article The “Ethics” of Ethical Investing (2003), contemplates whether 
ethical screens can even be ethically justified. Ethical or social screening usually holds 
both positive and negative screens, but Schwartz limits his analysis to negative 
screening. He argues that alcohol and tobacco should be excluded based on nearly any 
moral code due to their addictive and destructive features. Other negative screens, 
according to Schwartz, are more problematic. Gambling, which is one of the most 
common negative screens, is often a government sponsored activity e.g. governments 
around the world operate a lottery. According to American Gaming Association more 
than three quarters of US adults approve casino entertainment. And where is the 
ethical margin between gambling and investing? One could argue that investing in 
ethical funds is an act of gambling. Military and weapons industry is another 
controversial industry. Undeniably weapons are the reason for a lot of suffering and 
destruction, but could the use of aggressive force be also necessary to stop a greater 
evil. The obvious example is the disarmament of the Nazi regime, but lately weapons 
were also necessary in overthrowing such violent dictators as Saddam Hussein, 
Slobodan Milosevic and Muammar Gaddafi. Maybe weapons can be used in activities 
that might be considered morally appropriate or even desirable. For instance the US 
military has been known to provide assistance during natural disasters. (Schwartz 
2003.) 
 
Other negative screens also divide opinions. Nuclear power is often considered an 
unethical choice due to the incidents in Chernobyl, the 3 Mile Island and recently 
Fukushima. However the most likely alternatives for nuclear power are fossil fuels 
which aggravate global warming. Also animal testing is considered unethical, but some 
animal tests are used in order to produce life-saving drugs. And what about the use of 
child labor for a multinational company? One might argue that children would be 
forced to work anyway, but in this case the company would ensure safe working 
conditions and provide education and health services. Unethical indeed, but maybe it 
is the lesser of two evils. According to Schwartz (2003) labeling screens as ethical is 
misleading or even deceptive if they do not contain any ethical justification. He 
suggests that the word ”ethical” should be completely discarded. Screens are designed 
to reflect investor’s social, religious, or political attitudes and therefore they should be 
given a clear justification. (Schwartz 2003; Entine 2003.) 
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2.4.2 Methodological Issues 
The methodological concerns are primarily based on the assumption that SRI research 
data suffers from a lack of reliability and credibility. Entine, in his article The Myth of 
Social Investing: A Critique of its Practice and Consequences for Corporate Social 
Performance Research (2003), claims that the research is generated with insufficient 
resources and its subjectivity can be questioned.  Another issue of concern is the 
standards used in collecting data. The standards are, according to Entine, seemingly 
straight-forwards and often subjective and arbitrary. Different fund managers or 
researchers apply different screening practices without proper justification. Some may 
choose to screen-out companies that derive 50% or more of revenue from tobacco or 
alcohol, others choose 20% as the equivalent screen. No exhaustive explanation is 
given for these arbitrary percentages. Also Schwartz (2003) ponders the correct 
application of screens. He states that from an ethical perspective, an ambiguous use of 
screening percentages is problematic. Schwartz believes that firms should be morally 
evaluated based on the totality of their practices and that screens should be applied 
accordingly. (Entine 2003; Schwartz 2003.) 
 
According to Entine (2003) researchers also choose to ignore aspects of corporate 
activity that are hard to measure and are therefore biased against industries that are 
more transparent. For instance banks do not necessarily state the composition of their 
investments, this means that they may have high stakes in controversial industries, but 
if the banks façade is clean, they can be accepted as ethical. Schwartz (2003) believes 
that these screen infringements are not calculated, but nevertheless they do occur 
indirectly. For instance a paper company may supply cigarette paper to a tobacco 
company or an aluminum manufacturer may sell cans to a brewery. Simplistic screens 
often miss layered business models such as franchising and complex business 
structures typical for multinational and multi-industrial companies. Indirect 
contribution should, however, be incorporated in the screening process in order to 
retain ethical consistency. In reality a thorough screening process faces many practical 
difficulties. Researchers have admitted they often do not have the resources or the 
sophistication to go beyond a superficial analysis. (Entine 2003; Schwartz 2003.) 
 
In order to find an answer to SRI credibility issues Kempf and Osthoff (2008) conducted 
a study in which they investigated whether SRI funds truly do invest according to social 
and environmental standards. They matched the compositions of ethically identified 
mutual funds with ethical ratings provided by Kinder, Lyndenberg & Domini (KLD). 
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They also examined the possibility of ethical window dressing i.e., fund managers 
would change the composition of the fund just before the end of the fiscal year in 
order to improve their ethical rating. The sample consists of US equity funds which are 
analyzed from 1991 to 2004. Kempf and Osthoff found that SRI funds have a 
significantly higher ethical ranking than conventional funds with respect to every 
criterion the ranking is based on. Their findings also revealed that the higher ethical 
ranking of SRI funds was not obtained by window dressing strategies. (Kempf & 
Osthoff 2008.) 
 
However the fiercest criticism by Entine (2003) is towards KLD ratings. His allegations 
are based on several monitored issues. For instance the unscrupulous green-washing 
by Odawalla and The Body Shop raises questions. It has been alleged that there were 
personal relations between ethical raters and company executives. The other option is 
that the raters were simply too gullible to take their word, in any case, both options 
cast a shadow on the credibility of the raters. Entine also asserts that the numerical 
ratings used by researchers create an illusion of objectivity. The scores are based on an 
arbitrary system which has no scientific justification. A good rating was e.g. given for a 
company that introduced more that 10% of women in the board of members, but the 
quality or contributions of these board members were not examined. In another 
example points were given for innovative hiring programs, but the word “innovative” 
was not defined. Another issue arises when the qualitative factors need to be 
transformed into quantitative scores or ratings. These kinds of practices are 
completely subjective to the personal biases of the rater and according to Entine, 
these biases do exist. (Entine 2003.) 
 
Schwartz (2003) raises yet another point of concern: Which comes first, the financial 
performance or the ethical performance? In an example a Canadian Ethical fund 
persistently held on to shares of a chemical company after an environmental spill. Due 
to the incident the company stock was no longer eligible according to the funds 
environmental screen, but the stock price had also dropped significantly. Selling the 
stock would have been the correct action ethically, but it would have affected the fund 
performance radically. Schwartz argues that at minimum, ethical funds must clearly 
state whether financial returns or the ethical screens take priority in decision-making 
and explicitly disclose their approach to screen infringements. Schwartz also proposes 
that ethical funds should periodically conduct an ethical audit of their own activities in 
order to maintain full transparency and accountability. (Schwartz 2003.) 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
All financial theories make generalizations that often exclude the possibility of 
irrational behavior. Incorporating ethical preferences into investment decision making 
is one example of this kind of investor irrationality. For this reason there are a number 
of different theories that are said to explain socially responsible investing. The 
theoretical framework concerning socially responsible investing is dominated by two 
somewhat opposing theories: the Modern Portfolio Theory and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory. Recently there have also been concerns that stem from the growing interest in 
negative social screening. Another issue regarding this field of studies is whether 
addressing social issues is something companies should do to begin with or might 
there be a possibility for competitive advantage through corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
Adam Smith was one of the first to make the link between social responsibility and 
business. Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) was the cornerstone of the neoclassical 
theory, the basis of all financial theories. One of its statements was that any external 
social cost would lead to decreased value. Others recognized that social responsibility 
was not just a cost, but that the achieved gains of socially responsible actions would be 
modest compared to the complex costs of producing them. In fact classical economics 
and social welfare theorems did not see a conflict between maximizing shareholder 
value and social value. According to these theories social welfare is maximized when 
firms maximize their profits in a competitive and complete market. Although it was 
obvious that in practice it was not so, for many years to come there was a consensus 
that this was the absolute truth. (Renneboog  et al. 2008; Wagner 2001.) 
3.1 Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories 
In the 20th century the societal changes gave companies incentive to review the impact 
they have on the surrounding world and soon people started talking about corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Milton Friedman (1970) released an article where he 
expressed his concern regarding the growing interest on adopting CSR standards into 
business. Friedman stated that there is a fundamental discrepancy between CSR and 
the rational goal of wealth maximization of the shareholders. He argued that the 
principals of CSR would have long been incorporated into business if they would 
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improve profitability and that rationally operating companies should not take into 
account voluntary ethical measures. The assumption that CSR is only an external cost 
leads to the conclusion that taking CSR measures companies act against the interest of 
their shareholders. Friedman’s ideas have later been referred to as “the shareholder 
theory“ which makes the fundamental argument that the only social responsibility of a 
company is to increase its profits as long as it stays within the rules of the game.  Now, 
one might argue that the rules of the game have changed. Freeman (1984) questioned 
the shareholder theory and introduced the stakeholder theory, which redefined the 
purpose of a company. Freeman argued that a corporation not only bears 
responsibility to its shareholders, but to all the groups that are vital to the survival and 
success of the corporation.  These other groups, that have a stake in the company, 
include consumers, employees and the community at large. Although the two theories 
disagree on the responsibilities of a company, they both still view corporate social 
responsibility merely as an extra cost for the company.  
 
However a new take on Freeman’s Stakeholder theory has emerged in the last 
decades. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) may be used as a tool in gaining 
competitive advantage. Nowadays it is a generally accepted fact that companies 
cannot confide on the assumption that the industry structure will secure high returns. 
Competitive advantage gives companies a possibility to position themselves within 
their specific industry so that they can obtain economic rent. In other words they can 
gain profits that are higher than the cost of their capital. (Brealey, Myers, Allen 2006: 
281.) Traditionally there have been two schools of thought regarding CSR and 
economic performance, their relationship is either reviewed as strictly negative or 
positive. Wagner, Schaltegger & Wehrmeyer (2001) however suggest that the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and competitive advantage can be 
either positive or negative depending on their interdependence and integration.  They 
also suggest that a growing level of corporate social responsibility benefits the 
economic performance of a company to a certain optimal point after which CSR 
improvements can only increase costs and reduce profits. (Wagner et al. 2001.) 
 
Porter & van der Linde (1995) advocate that social responsibility can be a key element 
in improving the financial performance a company. Forcing companies to follow the 
trends of sustainable development is also important for the economy, because it 
would drive innovations and hence, improve the predominant technology. In return, 
this would enhance the profitability of the companies and would give them a 
competitive edge. Wagner (2005) was able to demonstrate that positive 
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environmental impact is a potential source for competitive advantage. To a certain 
point CSR-based competitive advantage allows companies to improve productivity, 
lower expenses and reach new markets.  
 
Due to the ever growing social awareness, companies have been obliged to integrate 
CSR into their practice. However only a few have had a consistent plan for CSR, let 
alone integrated it into strategy. Traditionally there have been four main reasons for 
the introduction of CSR standards: Moral obligation, sustainability, license to operate 
and reputation. Each of them aims to alleviate the tension between business and 
society when the focus, in fact, should be on their interdependence. If companies 
choose to take on CSR measures aligned with their strategy they can create shared 
value. Companies should therefore discard their views of CSR as a defensive tool and 
put more emphasis on creating a social impact. Companies should therefore start 
thinking in terms of “Corporate Social Integration” instead of “Corporate Social 
Responsibility”. (Porter & Kramer 2006.) 
3.2 The Modern Portfolio Theory 
In 1952 Markowitz released a paper titled “Portfolio Selection”, with the purpose of 
analyzing the relationship of risk and return when it comes to portfolio selection. The 
paper gave birth to what is now known as the Modern Portfolio Theory, which would 
eventually be refined as the Capital Asset Pricing Model by Treynor, Sharpe, Lintner 
and Mossin. The modern portfolio theory is the dominant theory regarding the 
expected underperformance of socially responsible investing. (Markowitz 1952.) 
 
The modern portfolio theory makes the assumption that investors should take into 
account that an optimal portfolio has the best possible risk-return relationship, 
investors should thus place their funds into securities that provide high returns with 
low variance. The modern portfolio theory also assumes that investors behave 
rationally; therefore if an investor has a choice between two securities with similar 
expected returns but different risk, the investor should select the one with lower risk. 
According to Markowitz, portfolio selection is divided into two separate stages. In the 
first stage investors make assumptions on the future performance of available 
securities based on observation and experiences. In the second stage investors acquire 
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all necessary information regarding the future performances, which is then utilized in 
creating an optimal portfolio. (Markowitz 1952: 77 – 79.) 
 
The portfolio theory concentrates on the effect of diversification on risk-return 
relationship of the portfolio. Investors may limit the risk exposure of a particular 
security by means of diversification of assets. By placing assets in a variety of different 
securities from different sectors of the economy, the overall risk of the portfolio can be 
less than that of any individual security within the portfolio. The more securities 
investors incorporate in their portfolios, the lower the variance. Markowitz however 
notes that variance can never completely disappear. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2009: 174 
– 176; Markowitz 1952.) 
 
The correlation between securities is the key in reducing risk. The correlation 
coefficient of two securities can vary from -1, being perfectly negatively correlated to 
+1, being perfectly positively correlated. Portfolio risk can be reduced by incorporating 
securities that have low or negative correlation, such as securities from different 
sectors of the economy. Investing in companies across sectors is more profitable since 
different sectors have different economic characteristics and have therefore lower 
covariance than companies within the sector. The correlation coefficient can be 
calculated by dividing their covariance by the product of the standard deviation. A 
positive covariance increases the risk of the portfolio and accordingly a negative 
covariance reduces risk. (Bodie et al. 2009: 177 – 178; Markowitz 1952.) 
 
Portfolio risk cannot be completely eliminated by adding an infinity of securities into 
the portfolio. The total risk can be divided into market risk or systematic risk and 
unique risk or unsystematic risk. The systematic risk proceeds from macroeconomic 
factors that affect all securities and the unsystematic risk is formed by all risk factors 
that affect an individual company or sector. By means of diversification the 
unsystematic risk can be reduced to a minimum, but the market risk still remains. 
(Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 30 – 31; Markowitz 1952: 79.) 
33 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The efficient frontier and the optimal risky portfolio. (Edinformatics 2010.) 
 
In order to achieve an appropriate complete portfolio one must first single out all risk-
return combinations available from risky assets. When calculating the lowest possible 
variances for any given portfolio one can create a minimum-variance frontier. On the 
frontier lies also the global minimum-variance portfolio and the part of the frontier 
that lies above it can be defined as the Efficient Frontier.  After this one has to 
calculate the optimal risky portfolio by selecting the optimal proportion of assets in the 
portfolio in order to achieve the highest possible risk-return relationship for the capital 
allocation line (CAL). The point where the capital allocation line is supported by the 
tangency portfolio located on the efficient frontier, is the point where we find the 
optimal risky portfolio or the tangency portfolio (Figure 2). Finally one can determine 
the risk-free rate for the investments, incorporate it with the risky assets and obtain an 
appropriate complete portfolio. (Bodie et al. 2009: 240 – 241; Copeland & Weston 
1988: 178 – 179.) 
 
There are several reasons why investors who believe in the modern portfolio theory 
should expect underperformance from socially responsible investing. First of all, the 
very nature of socially responsible investing differs from traditional investing. The 
Modern portfolio theory expects that investors base their decisions on risk and return 
expectations, which are usually derived from a multitude of fundamental factors. If 
investors, however, would let their decision be affected by non-fundamental factors, 
such as social responsibility, they would be less inclined to alter them in case of a 
downturn. This would eventually lead to underperformance. Then again some are 
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willing to accept it as a contribution to the underlying cause. (Hickman, Teets & Kohls 
1999; Bodie et al. 2009: 246.) 
 
Socially responsible investing, in its most common form, is based on screening. For 
socially responsible investors this means that their universe of investment 
opportunities becomes smaller. By assuming that all modern portfolio theory 
assumptions hold, then screening securities will lead to a position where absolute 
diversification is no longer possible. Restricting this universe will shift the efficient 
frontier down and results in a suboptimal portfolio. In other words there is a cost for 
socially responsible investing in form of a lower risk return relationship. (Kurtz 2005; 
Bodie et al 2009: 246.) The risk proceeding from restrained diversification is valid 
especially for investors whose choices are limited to begin with, may this be due to 
other convictions or simply lack of professionalism.  Moreover, for skilled investors the 
narrowed universe of investment opportunities leads to a reduced amount of upside 
outliers they can capture.  (Kurtz 2005; Geczy, Stambaugh & Levin 2005.) 
 
Moskowitz was the first one to challenge the assumptions of the modern portfolio 
theory in respect with socially responsible investing. In 1972 Moskowitz released an 
article called “Choosing responsible stocks”, where he presented fourteen socially 
aware companies for investors. He had noticed that socially responsible investing 
could, in fact, be profitable for investors and suggested a new perspective on the 
efficient frontier. He argued that socially responsible companies could bear a special 
sensitivity, which gives them an edge for surpassing competition. In other words the 
strictest reading of the modern portfolio theory would not apply, when it comes to 
socially responsible investing. Soon after, other financial theories would corroborate 
his views. (Moskowitz 1972; Kurtz 2005.) 
3.3 The Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
In introduced the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) which presented a different approach 
for stock pricing. When the modern portfolio theory focuses on the construction of an 
efficient portfolio, the arbitrage pricing theory assumes that any investor is willing to 
increase the return of the portfolio if it can be done without increasing the risk. The 
way to do this, is by means of arbitrage. The model assumes that stock returns depend 
partly on the influence of different “factors” and partly on “noise”. The factors stem 
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from different macroeconomic influences and the noise arises from unique company 
specific events. (Brealey et al. 2006: 199.) 
 
The arbitrage pricing model consists from a variety of different factors that affect the 
stock return. The theory does not state what the factors are, simply that the factors 
and their sensitivity vary between companies. For example an airline is by nature more 
sensitive to changes in crude oil price, than a textile manufacturer. The return is 
therefore assumed to pursue the following pattern (Brealey et al. 2006: 199.): 
 
                                                                               
 
Where   is the expected return,            represent the sensitivity for each factor 
and   is the noise coefficient.  
 
The factors can be anything from changes in GDP or discount rates to weather 
conditions and social responsibility. Similarly to the modern portfolio theory the 
arbitrage pricing theory assumes there are two sources of risk. Since the unique risk 
(noise) can be eliminated by diversifying assets, the expected risk premium should 
then depend on the factors and the stock’s sensitivity to them. Thus the formula is 
(Brealey et al. 2006: 199): 
 
                                                                                 
 
Where    is the risk free rate and      is the expected risk premium.  
 
The arbitrage pricing theory is based on the assumptions that the market is perfectly 
competitive and frictionless, investors are risk-avoiding rational beings and the number 
of available securities is higher than the number of factors. In these conditions two 
well diversified portfolios should behave similarly if their factor bets are the same. In 
other words the arbitrage pricing theory assumes that both portfolios should produce 
the same return and arbitrage would not exist. (Roll & Ross 1980: 1076; Nikkinen et al. 
2002: 76 – 79.) 
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In terms of socially responsible investing, the arbitrage pricing theory offers a more 
positive view on its expected performance. As the modern portfolio theory expects 
that social screening would lead to underperformance due to lack of diversification, 
the arbitrage pricing theory makes no such a statement. Engaging in social investing 
would not lead to a performance penalty if the factor bets are adjusted to resemble 
those of the benchmark and the effect of “noise” is reduced to a similar level. Indeed a 
certain amount of diversification is necessary in order to reduce the effect of the 
unique risk, the stringency of screens cannot therefore be too restrictive. To sum up, 
investors who choose to invest in a social manner are able eliminate the expected 
theoretical underperformance of their portfolio if they are willing to optimize it to the 
benchmark. (Kurtz 2005.) 
3.4 Value Investing Theory 
The generally acknowledged disadvantage of the arbitrage pricing theory is that it does 
not state what are the factors that influence stock returns. There have been many 
attempts to testify a general set of factors that would apply to all companies. In 1992 
Fama and French studied the affect of company size and book-to-market (B/M) ratio to 
US stock returns over the period of 1962–1989. They found out that stocks of small 
companies and stocks with a high book-to-market ratio had outperformed the market. 
Evidence showed that these factors were closely related to company profitability. The 
findings led to the inception of the “Fama-French three-factor model”, a more specific 
take on the arbitrage pricing model (Fama & French 1992; Brealey et al. 2006: 203.): 
 
                            
                                                                
 
Where:                 is the return on market index minus risk-free interest rate 
               is the return on small firms minus return on large firms 
            is the return on high B/M firms minus return on low B/M 
firms 
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The findings of Fama and French (1992) regarding the B/M ratio have resulted in the 
widely accepted assumption that “value” stocks perform better than “growth” stocks. 
However there are a number of other measures that indicate whether a company is 
value or growth oriented. Any stock that has a low market price in comparison to 
earnings, dividends or historical prices can be considered a value stock. Nevertheless 
all evidence seems to point out that value stocks perform better in the long run. (Fama 
& French 1992; Blake 2000: 545.) 
 
A quick cross-section of socially responsible portfolios reveals that most of them have 
a growth bias. The finding is not very surprising, since it is clear that for instance 
resource-extractive industries, that are not attractive from SRI stand point, fall into the 
value stock category. Moreover the beta of socially responsible portfolios tends to be 
above 1, which implies outperformance in a bull market, but then again 
underperformance in a bear market. In other words value investing theory implies that 
growth oriented socially responsible investing cannot outperform the market in the 
long run. (Abramson & Chung 2000; Kurtz 2005.) 
 
Value investing notions per se do not contradict with those of socially responsible 
investing, but they do contradict with the way most socially responsible portfolios are 
managed. Since evidence shows that current SRI portfolios tend to be growth oriented, 
believers in value investing would be likely to discard social responsibility as a viable 
criteria. In 2000 Abramson and Chung were, however, able to demonstrate that value 
oriented socially responsible investing did not lead to performance penalty. Evidently 
SRI benchmarks still seem to be less biased on growth, but again modern quantitative 
tools enable investors to adjust the factor bets of their portfolio according to their 
individual preferences. (Kurtz 2005; Abramson & Chung 2000.) 
4.5 The Neglected Company Effect  
The growing interest in socially responsible investing has also created an opposing 
investment strategy. As many social investors share common exclusion criteria in 
selecting stocks, some have raised up the question whether this could influence their 
performance. The stock selection of unethical investing is based on a reversed negative 
screening process, so to that extent unethical portfolios are subject to same arguments 
as socially responsible portfolios. In other words MPT and APT assumptions hold also 
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for unethical investing based on screening practices. Then again evidence shows that 
unethical portfolios tend to be value biased, which would imply better long-term 
performance in comparison to growth biased SRI portfolios. However there are 
additional theories that might explain the abnormal performance of sin stocks. Due to 
their dubious nature, they do not share a widespread interest among institutional 
investors, moreover sin stocks often possess special characteristics that may have 
positive and negative effects on stock performance.  
 
The neglected company effect is the most common argument for the possible 
outperformance of sin stocks. The modern portfolio theory and the arbitrage pricing 
theory both rely on market efficiency, that is to say they both assume that all publicly 
available information diffuses instantaneously to stock prices. Conversely the 
neglected company effect is based on the assumption that the market, in reality, is 
inefficient. The information which affects the stock price comes not only from the 
company itself, but from a variety of different sources. Although information may be 
available, investors and analysts tend to treat different pieces of information 
differently and therefore the pace of the diffusion of information to prices differs 
respectively. Asset price behavior depends basically on the nature of the information 
and the time it takes to analyze its content. For instance profit warnings usually take 
no time at all while even years after a release of a study, the academic community still 
argues on its validity. Another form of market inefficiency, when it comes to the 
diffusion of information, arises when investors do not share the same amount of 
attention to each stock. If a stock is not followed on a regular basis by professional 
analysts or is left out by institutional investors, it is referred to as a” neglected stock”.  
(Merton 1987.) 
 
Most individual investors keep a majority of direct investments, but some of the assets 
are invested through ownership of mutual funds, pensions and trusts. Institutional 
investors, such as pension funds, universities, religious organizations, banks and 
insurance companies are often exposed to public scrutiny. Therefore many have 
implemented social standards that limit their possibilities to invest in ethically 
questionable securities. Moreover a number of institutional investors have a 
restriction of exceeding a predetermined percentage of the total portfolio when 
purchasing securities, therefore they cannot react on all information. (Merton 1987; 
Hong & Kacperczyk 2009.) 
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Even though the number of indirect investments is only a fraction of direct 
investments, individual investors follow the lead of professional portfolio managers. 
Therefore individual investors tend to neglect the same stocks they do and are usually 
aware of only a small number of available securities in the market. This leads a smaller 
investor base for these neglected stocks. Merton’s study reveals that neglected stocks 
which had a small investor base had relatively larger expected returns than those that 
had a large investor base and “complete information” on which to act. According to 
Bodie et. al (2009) the higher equilibrium return for these stocks can be interpreted as 
a compensation for the risk associated with the lack of information. For this reason it is 
not necessarily a case of market inefficiency, but an additional risk premium for the 
companies in question. Merton concludes that the excess return of neglected stocks 
would disappear if professional money managers could identify them and start 
following them more closely. However this does not apply in the case of sin stocks 
because they have been neglected deliberately. (Merton 1987; Bodie et al. 2009: 391.) 
4.6 Other Implications of Negative Screening 
When it comes to social screening the group of neglected stocks is very specific and 
the underlying companies tend to have similar characteristics when it comes to the 
risks they carry and the very nature of their business. The general disapproval of their 
business, places sin companies in a position where they face higher regulatory scrutiny 
than conventional companies. On the other hand, strong regulation creates an 
environment where only the strong survive, which gives a competitive edge to 
companies that manage to outlive competitors. Regulatory risk comes in many forms. 
Sin companies, for instance, are subject to higher litigation exposure than other 
companies. Companies are unable to operate without significant legal assistance, 
which is a major cost factor. Evidently alcohol and tobacco industries have to bear the 
cost of unhealthy consumption, but to some extent the same applies for gambling and 
other sin industries. The risk of legal costs requires special attention and may therefore 
have a depressing effect on stock prices. Consequently sin companies tend to have low 
P/E and P/B ratios, which would put them in the value-stock category. High litigation 
risk may result in damaged company reputation and consumer confidence, therefore 
investors are expected to require an increased risk premium for the stock. (Salaber 
2009; Hong & Kacperczyk 2009.) 
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Another cost related risk for sin companies is the risk of increasing excise taxation. All 
selective taxes, related levies and charges of a specific product or service constitute 
excise taxation. It is by nature selective and discriminating, therefore the charges it 
places vary according to necessity. The purpose of excise taxation is to increase income 
that alleviates the external costs the product or service creates, but also to discourage 
consumption. From an economic point of view the high taxation of addictive products, 
such as tobacco, alcohol and gambling, is justifiable. These kinds of products lack of 
natural substitutes, which implies inelasticity in demand. In addition the consumption 
of detrimental products creates external costs in form of physical, financial and 
psychological costs that users and producers of these products inflict on others. The 
revenues generated by excise taxation can alleviate the external costs when properly 
allocated. Excise taxation has also a motive which is not related to the creation of 
revenues, this motive is to discourage consumption. High level of taxation and pricing 
seems to be the preferred way in reducing the overall negative impact of detrimental 
products. Increasing excise taxation is a risk factor for investors who choose to invest 
in sin stocks, therefore it should also reflect on the pricing of the stocks. (Salaber 
2009.) 
 
The public opinion is often persuaded by the media, for this reason the headline risk is 
something that has to be taken into account. Headline risk refers to the depreciating 
effect a piece of news has on the stock value. Controversial industries are constantly 
being valued from the social perspective and their every action is monitored and 
questioned. It is therefore not surprising that any piece of news is often interpreted as 
negative and negative news always obtain more coverage. Companies considered to 
neglect the social impact they create, are perceived by the market to sustain a 
permanent headline risk. (Fabozzi et al. 2008.) 
 
What sin industries also have in common is that due to their nature, they all have 
significant barriers to entry. All of the aforementioned risk factors in part make sin 
industries less interesting for new entrepreneurs. This gives the existing companies 
competitive advantage in form of oligopolistic and even monopolistic power. The mere 
existence of sin industries is controlled by a wide set of rules and restrictions, not to 
mention legislative regulations. In order to operate gambling or gaming business 
companies have to undergo a long and tedious process in order to get all necessary 
permits and licenses. In many countries governments hold total control over tobacco 
and alcohol industries, if they have been liberated from government monopole, they 
are subdued to a strict set of regulations. Pharmaceutical and weapons industries, on 
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the other hand, are very capital intensive. Research and development in these 
industries has a high cost, hence it creates a natural economic barrier to entry. 
Moreover they are very vulnerable to shifts in political climate, which can make or 
destroy a company. All things considered, any company operating in sin industries that 
has managed to overcome all obstacles has earned its particular position in the market 
and should therefore be compensated with higher returns. (Fabozzi et al. 2008.) 
 
All risk factors associated with sin companies, litigation risk, excise taxation risk and 
headline risk, have two distinct effects on the stocks. First they lead to a permanent 
discount in valuation, second they place a higher premium of expected return on the 
stock. All risk factors considered sin stocks are, hence, expected to underperform. 
However the extremely challenging field, in which sin companies operate, decimates 
competition giving the remaining companies higher pricing power. This might result in 
high returns and therefore better stock performance. (Fabozzi et al. 2008.) 
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4. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
There is no question that the performance of SRI has been most analyzed in the 
modern portfolio theory framework. The research has concentrated on analyzing the 
performance of different socially selected indices or funds by a variety of different 
measures, however some researchers have also constructed their own portfolios. 
Some studies have been conducted from the perspective arbitrage pricing theory by 
using factor models. Some of these studies attempt to show how the expected 
performance can be manipulated by adjusting the sensitivity to factors, whilst others 
use factor-models in order to eliminate distortion in results. The effects of negative 
screening have also been studied, mainly from the perspective of unethical investing, 
but also vis-a-vis the effects of positive screening. The studies in this chapter are 
presented in a chronological order and have all brought a new or improved approach 
in the study of SRI performance. A summary of the studies is presented in table 2 at 
the end of the chapter.  
 
The first notable study on the performance of socially responsible investing was 
conducted by Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993). They analyze the performance of 32 
socially responsible mutual funds from January 1981 to December 1990. As a measure 
of excess return they use Jensen’s Alpha. Their findings show that socially responsible 
mutual funds do not produce statistically significant excess returns, but also that their 
performance does not differ from the performance of conventional mutual funds. 
From the perspective of the modern portfolio theory this was not to be expected. 
 
Diltz (1995) studies the impact of social ethical screens on portfolio performance. In 
order to analyze the effect of screening, Diltz uses a corporate social responsibility 
rating provided by the Council on Economic Priorities. Based on the ratings he creates 
14 portfolio pairs from a universe of 159 companies. One of the portfolios of each pair 
consists of companies which received the highest rating for a given ethical screen, and 
the other portfolio consists of companies which received the lowest rating. The 
examined time period is from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1991. By using the 
measures of Jensen’s Alpha and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
Diltz finds that ethical screening does not seem to have neither negative nor positive 
impact on portfolio performance. He also notes that ethical screening does not seem 
constrain the portfolio return for a given systematic risk. 
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Sauer (1997) studies the effect of social screening on portfolio performance. Sauer 
aims to eliminate the possible effect of transaction costs, management fees, and 
differences in investment policy that are associated in actively managed mutual funds. 
He uses the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) as a proxy for socially responsible 
investing and the S&P 500 as well as the Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices 
-indices as unrestricted and well diversified benchmarks. The performance of the 
portfolios is followed between 1986 and 1994 on measures of monthly raw returns 
and variability, Jensen’s alpha, and the Sharpe ratio. Consistent with previous studies, 
Sauer finds that social screening does not have a significant effect on the portfolio 
performance. He concludes that for a socially responsible investor the total risk would 
be a more appropriate measure of risk exposure than the market risk. 
 
DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999) take the approach of arbitrage pricing theory by trying 
to show that social responsibility is not a discounting factor. They follow the 
performance of the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) and S&P 500 index from May of 
1990 through January 1999. They apply an APT-model which uses seven 
macroeconomic variables as its factors in order to discover the sensitivity to each 
factor. They then reweight the DSI 400 portfolio so that the factor loadings would 
match those of S&P 500 index. They find that the unoptimized DSI 400 portfolio 
outperformed S&P 500 index and the performance of the optimized DSI 400 portfolio 
did not significantly differ from that of S&P 500. DiBatolomeo and Kurtz also presume 
that the outperformance of the unoptimized DSI 400 is related to its growth 
orientation on a bullish market and that social screening itself is not the factor, but 
rather the cause for the growth bias. 
 
Hickman, Teets and Kohls (1999) examine what effect incorporating social funds has on 
the risk/return relationship of a portfolio. Six socially responsible funds were examined 
over the period of 1991 through 1995. Hickman et al. created portfolios by 
implementing different proportions of the funds into the S&P 500 index. By examining 
the efficient frontier of the portfolios they discovered that S&P 500 index is not an 
optimal risky portfolio, but a better risk/return relationship can be achieved by 
incorporating an appropriate mix of social funds. However none of the funds were able 
to outperform the S&P 500 index over the time period. The results of the study seem 
to indicate that social funds have a low correlation with the market, so they can be 
used as means of diversification. 
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The first important study on socially responsible investing as part of value investing 
was conducted by Abramson and Chung (2000). They differentiate value stocks from 
Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) by measures of relative dividend yield and relative 
market capitalization-to-revenues. The created value subset of the DSI 400 is then 
compared to other value indices from the year 1990 to 2000. The performance is 
measured based on quarterly rebalance strategy and buy-and-hold strategy. Abramson 
and Chung find that both strategies produced higher returns than the average of the 
benchmarks. They conclude that based on their findings socially responsible investing 
seems to be style-neutral. 
 
Statman (2000) revises his original study with Hamilton and Jo (1993) by including both 
mutual funds and stock indices in his study. He uses the S&P 500 index and the Domini 
400 Social Index (DSI 400) as benchmarks for 31 socially responsible funds and 
conventional funds. The period of the study extends from 1990 to 1998. The 
performance is measured by Jensen’s Alpha and excess standard-deviation-adjusted 
return, a modified version of the Sharpe ratio. Statman finds that the DSI 400 
performed equally with the S&P 500 Index. Socially responsible mutual funds 
performed worse than the indices, but no worse than conventional mutual funds. 
 
Blank, and Carty (2002) study whether environmentally conscious companies can 
deliver superior returns, the so called “eco-efficiency anomaly”. They use Innovest 
ethical ratings when selecting companies in the S&P 500 index form 1997 to 2000. 
They apply the arbitrage pricing model in order to create an environmentally 
responsible version of the index with similar factor bets. Blank and Carty identified 20 
systematic sensitivities which they used as factors in the APT model. The findings show 
that the environmentally responsible portfolio clearly outperformed the S&P 500. The 
top rated companies’ also outperformed bottom rated companies in the most 
environmentally sensitive industries. Blank and Carty conclude that according to their 
study the eco-efficiency anomaly seems to exist, although the phenomenon should be 
investigated on a longer time period. 
 
Also Derwall, Günster, Bauer and Koedijk (2005) study the concept of eco-efficiency. 
They selected a longer period (1995 – 2003) in order to find out whether 
environmentally responsible companies delivered a long-run premium or penalty. They 
constructed two mutually exclusive stock portfolios and ranked them based on 
Innovest rating. They find that the high-ranked portfolio provided significantly higher 
average returns compared to the low-ranked portfolio. Derwall et al. apply a wide 
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range of performance attribution techniques which also show that the performance 
differential cannot be explained by differences in market sensitivity, investment style, 
or industry-specific components. 
 
Shank, Manullang and Hill (2005) take the approach of including individual stocks in 
the research. They compare the performance of three socially responsible mutual 
funds, the NYSE Composite Index, and 11 firms most valued by socially responsible 
mutual fund managers. Their performance is followed on 3 and 5 year investing 
periods from 1998 to 2003. Measured by Jensen’s Alpha Shank et al. find that the 
performance of socially responsible investing varies in the short run, but statistically 
significant positive returns were discovered in the longer time-horizon. 
 
Kim and Venkatachalam (2006) study whether the neglect of sin stocks is caused by 
the information risk arising from poor financial reporting quality. They observe US 
publicly-traded stocks in the gaming, tobacco, and alcohol industries from 1988 to 
2003. The sample comprises of 111 unique firms and the control sample of 2,441 
unique firms. Kim and Venkatachalam find that sin stocks outperformed the control 
sample. Moreover they find that sin firms have superior financial reporting quality. 
They conclude that despite the superior returns, investors seem to include non 
financial factors into the investment selection criteria. 
 
Also Barnett and Salomon (2006) attempt to measure the link between financial and 
social performance of socially responsible investment funds, but their study focuses on 
the intensity of screening. The sample consists of 61 SRI funds from 1972 to 2000. The 
financial performance is measured on a monthly basis and the social performance on 
the number of applied screens. Barnett and Salomon find a curvilinear relation 
between screening intensity and performance. In other words as the number of 
screens increases, performance first decreases and then increases. The researchers 
explain this phenomenon with two factors. First the funds which apply only a few 
screens do not significantly differ from conventional funds and therefore it does not 
affect the performance. Second the funds which apply a large number of screens tend 
to select the companies with the highest standards and this, according to the 
stakeholder theory, should result in superior performance. The problem is with funds 
that are found in the middle. These funds suffer from the lack of diversification, but 
their screens are not stringent enough to only hold companies with outstanding social 
responsibility. 
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Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) have the most prominent study concerning the field of 
unethical investing. The early version of the study was first released as a working paper 
in 2005, so it can be defined as the pioneering study concerning this field. Hong and 
Kacperczyk study the performance of 184 US sin stocks in the gaming, tobacco, and 
alcohol industries over the period 1926 – 2006. They find that over the observation 
period their behavior is similar to those of value stocks. Furthermore, they observe 
that the excess returns are attributed by the neglect by institutional market 
participants and the fact that they receive less coverage from analysts. The neglected 
stock effect as well as the increased litigation risk of sin stocks heightens the expected 
returns of sin stocks, this consequently reflects directly to the cost of capital for these 
companies. They conclude that the existence of limits to arbitrage on sin stocks is a 
clear sign of market inefficiency. 
 
Lobe, Roithmeier and Walkshäusl (2009) take the approach of directly comparing, both 
socially responsible investing and unethical investing styles from July 1995 to July 
2007. They create a sin-index consisting of a total number of 755 stocks across 51 
countries from adult entertainment, alcohol, gambling, nuclear power, tobacco, and 
weapons industries.  They compare the performance of their index with a set of 32 
internationally acknowledged SRI indices and employ the MSCI World Index as a 
benchmark for conventional investing. The performance is measured by CAPM and 
multifactor models. Lobe et al. first report that unexpectedly they find no statistically 
significant difference in risk-adjusted returns between the sin-index and conventional 
benchmarks. Moreover they find no significant difference between the two investment 
styles performance wise. They also note that the performance of sin indices is value-
oriented, when the performance of SRI indices is growth-oriented. Lobe et al. conclude 
that ethics based individual preferences can be incorporated in investment decision 
making, since they do not seem to have any significant effect on the performance. 
 
Statman and Glushkov (2009) investigate the effect of different screens on SRI 
performance. The sample is constructed from the KLD dataset, which was 
implemented in 1991 to follow the socially responsible performance of DS 400 and 
S&P 500 companies. KLD data later on has expanded its coverage to include all 
companies in the Russell 3000 Index and the number of observed companies has 
grown from approximately 650 to 2,955 by the year 2006.  The observation period is 
between 1991 and 2006. The performance of each screen is measured on the market 
model, the Fama-French 3-factor model and the Carhart’s 4-factor model. The results 
indicate that positive and negative screening may impact portfolio performance in 
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different ways. Statman and Glushkov find a positive relation between positive 
screening and portfolio performance but a negative relation between negative 
screening and portfolio performance. They suggest that the advantages generated 
from the tilt toward companies with high social responsibility scores might be nullified 
by the negative effects from excluding sin stocks. According to the researchers this is 
possibly the reason why prior studies have not been able to find any significant 
difference between SRI and conventional investing. Statman and Glushkov suggest that 
portfolio managers should adopt the best-in-class method when constructing their 
portfolios in order to avoid this effect.  
 
Also Lee, Humphrey, Benson and Ahn (2010) study the effects of screening intensity. 
They attempt to find evidence of a linear or curvilinear relation between the number 
of employed screens and portfolio performance. The portfolio performance is divided 
into risk and return and they relations to screening intensity is studied separately. The 
sample consist of 61 US equity funds reported by the Social Investment Forum which 
are examined from 1989 to 2006. Lee et al. find that screening does not affect the 
unadjusted return of the portfolio, however they do find, that when applying the 
Carhart’s model, the return declines by 70 basis points per additional screen. In terms 
of risk, they find no significant relation between unsystematic risk and screening 
intensity. Conversely, they find a curvilinear relation between screening intensity and 
systematic risk. They argue that the results indicate that fund managers attempt to 
favor stocks with lower beta, but the universe of acceptable low beta stocks diminishes 
as more screens are imposed. However, it seems that if the systematic risk is 
disregarded, adequate diversification can be obtained even in portfolios with very 
intense screening. 
 
Copp, Kremmer and Roca (2010) examine the similarities of risk-adjusted returns 
between socially responsible investments and conventional investments during the 
latest economic downturns in Australia and worldwide. The sample consists of four 
indices from which the Dow Jones Total Stock Market Index-World (DJTM World) and 
the Dow Jones Total Stock Market Index-Australia (DJTM Australia) represent 
conventional investments and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index-World (DJSI World) 
and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index-Australia (DJSI Australia) represent SRI. The 
weekly price indices are gathered from the June 1994 to May 2009 providing a total 
804 observations. The researchers apply the market model and GARCH model in order 
to estimate betas over the time period for both SRI funds and conventional investment 
funds.  The state of the market in different economic cycles is categorized into 
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“normal” economic conditions and downturns with the application of dummy 
variables. They find that conventional equity investment returns decline during an 
economic downturn. Also SRI returns decline, but not as much as conventional 
investments. They also find that in an economic downturn socially responsible 
investments become riskier than conventional investments, especially worldwide. 
 
Humphrey and Lee (2011) revisit their previous study (Lee et al. 2010) on the effects of 
screening intensity by investigating the performance and risk of SRI equity funds in the 
Australian market and worldwide. The sample comprises 27 SRI funds and 514 
conventional funds as the benchmark. The observation period extends from January 
1996 to December 2008. The performance of SRI is measured on the market model 
and the Carhart’s four factor model. The screening intensity is studied by regressing 
the performance of each individual SRI fund against the number of positive and 
negative screens. Humphrey and Lee do not find any significant differences in the 
returns between SRI and conventional funds and little evidence to suggest that 
positive or negative screening impacts fund performance. However they do find 
indications that highly screened portfolios offer higher risk-adjusted returns and that 
an increase in the number of screens significantly decreases market risk. When it 
comes to screening intensity, it would appear that increasing the number of positive 
screens significantly reduces total and diversifiable risk, but SRI funds which impose a 
large number of negative screens may suffer from a lack of diversification. They also 
find a curvilinear relation between the number of screens and idiosyncratic risk (similar 
to Lee et al. 2010), and a negative relation between the number of screens and 
systematic risk. 
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Table 2. Chronological summary of previous studies. 
Study Year Data Observed Approach Main findings 
Hamilton et al. 1993 32 US SRI funds 1981–1990 MPT SRI fund performance does not differ from conventional 
funds 
Diltz 1995 14 portfolio pairs 1990-1991 MPT Screening has no effect on performance 
Sauer 1997 DSI 400 1986-1994 MPT No effect on performance. For SRIs, the total risk is a 
more appropriate measure than the market risk. 
DiBartolomeo 
et al. 
1999 DSI 400 1990-1999 APT By adjusting the factor bets of the SRI portfolio, the 
differences in performance can eliminated. SRIs seem to 
have a growth bias. 
Hickman et al.  1999 6 SRI funds 1991-1995 MPT SRI funds have a low correlation with the market, so they 
can be used as means of diversification. 
Abramson & 
Chung 
2000 Value stocks from 
DSI 400 
1990-2000 VIT Value subset of DSI outperformed the market. SRI seems 
to be style-neutral. 
Statman 2000 31 Us SRI funds & 
DSI 400 
1990–1998  MPT DSI performance was equal to market. SRI funds 
underperformed, but equally to conventional funds. 
Blank & Carty 2002 Eco-subset of S&P 
500 index 
1997-2000 APT Eco-subset outperformed the S&P 500 index. Top rated 
companies outperformed bottom rated companies. 
Derwall et al. 2005 Portfolio  on 
Innovest ratings 
1995-2003 APT High ranked portfolio outperformed the low ranked 
portfolio. 
Shank et al. 2005 3 SRI funds & 11 
SRI firms 
1998-2003 MPT Performance varies in the short run, but positive returns 
can be found in the long-run 
Kim & 
Venkatachalam 
2006 111 sin stocks 1988-2003 NCE Sin stocks outperformed the control sample. The neglect 
seems to be based on non financial factors. 
Barnett & 
Salomon  
2006 61 SRI funds 1972-2000 MPT/SHT There is a curvilinear relation between screening 
intensity and performance. 
Hong & 
Kacperczyk 
2009 184 US sin stocks 1926-2006 NCE Sin stocks outperformed the market and behave 
similarly as value stocks. 
Lobe et al. 2009 755 sin stocks & 
32 SRI indices 
1995-2007 MPT & 
APT 
No difference in performance between SRI and sin 
stocks, but sin stocks are value-oriented and SRI indices 
growth-oriented.  
Statman & 
Glushkov 
2009 KLD data 1991-2006 MPT & 
APT 
Exclusionary (Qualitative) screening has a negative 
(positive) relation with portfolio performance. 
Lee et al. 2010 61 US equity 
funds 
1989-2006 MPT & 
APT 
There is a curvilinear relation between screening 
intensity and systematic risk, but no relation with 
unsystematic risk 
Copp et al. 2010 DJTM & DJSI 
indices 
1994-2009 MPT In a downturn DJSI became riskier, but outperformed 
DJTM 
Humphrey & 
Lee 
2011 27 SRI funds 1996-2008 MPT& APT Intensifying positive screening reduces diversifiable risk, 
but intensifying negative screening may result in lack of 
diversification 
            
MPT = Modern Portfolio Theory, APT = Arbitrage Pricing Theory, SHT = Stakeholder Theory, NCE = Neglected company effect, VIT = Value Investing Theory 
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5. DATA  
This chapter opens the empirical part of the study. The starting point of the study is to 
create an effective way to rank companies based on their social responsibility. This is 
done by applying The Ethical Quote data, which was provided by a third party. The 
description of this data is presented first, naturally the data also needed to be 
modified for research purposes. In this case the ethical data is patched together with 
stock data in order to create portfolios with different attributes. The portfolio 
construction is presented in detail and all necessary data modification and eliminations 
are explained. The final sample is then evaluated and discussed with the intention of 
discovering possible defects and partialities. 
5.1 Ethical Quote data 
As abovementioned, the basis of the study was to find a reliable scoring system in 
order to rank companies based on their social responsibility. There are several 
providers for such a data from which the most prominent is Covalence, an 
independent company based in Geneva, Switzerland. The company gathers and 
maintains Ethical Quote which is an ethical reputation scoring system that tracks the 
world’s largest companies. Covalence also offers reputation research and ESG ratings.  
The company reports that its mission is to increase the density of information on 
business ethics and to offer this information for finance professionals. Information 
provided by Covalence has also been acknowledged in scientific papers (e.g. Erwin 
2010; Maon, Lindgreen & Swaen 2010). Currently, Covalence Ethical Quote Ranking 
covers a universe of 581 companies within 18 sectors following the Dow Jones Sector 
Titans. 
 
Ethical Quote score is based on publicly available online information gathered from 
search engines, individual websites and correspondents. The primary objective is to 
gather the largest quantity of relevant information with scientific rigor. For Covalence 
neutrality is the most important value, therefore all sources are considered equally 
and as reliable as the other.  
 
News items are classified according to 45 criteria, which are classified into the 
following 4 groups: 
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 I. Working Conditions (e.g. standards, wages, diversity and social benefits) 
 II. Impact of Production (e.g. job creation, fiscal contributions and 
environmental impact of production) 
 III. Impact of Product (e.g. product social utility and product environmental risk. 
 IV. Institutional Impact (e.g. human rights policy, United Nations Policy and 
anti-corruption policy) 
Covalence criteria are designed to cover any multinational company and to allow 
cross-sector comparisons. The criteria are based on the contribution to human 
development according to an international legal framework. The specifics of each 
criterion are derived from: 
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976) 
 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy (1977) 
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) 
 Copenhagen Agreements on Social Development (1995) 
 United Nations Global Compact (2000) 
 United Nations Millennium Declaration & Millennium Goals (2000) 
(Covalence criteria of business contribution to human development are more 
thoroughly addressed in appendix 1) 
 
Each news item is given a score of 1 or 2 points depending on how detailed the 
information is. The points get a positive or a negative sign according to the orientation 
of the information. The Ethical Quote score of each company is calculated from the 
points given on different pieces of news concerning the company in question. The 
absolute score is then adjusted for media exposure and size biases. For the research, 
all US companies from the Ethical Quote data were selected, starting from the 
inception of the tracking system in 2002. The number of US companies tracked by 
Covalence has gradually grown from 75 to 240 by the end of 2010. A dynamic ranking 
based on the Ethical Quote score of each individual company was then created from 
the data. (Covalence 2011.) 
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5.2 Portfolio construction 
In order to investigate the hypotheses from different angles, a total of seven portfolios 
were created. The compositions of each portfolio in this study are based on the Ethical 
Quote scores. First of all the stringency of social screening is investigated through five 
portfolios with different threshold-levels. These portfolios represent the companies 
with the top 25%, 20%, 15%, 10% and 5% of Ethical Quote scores, and are referred to 
as “stringency portfolios”. Evidently the screening stringency also leads to a 
diminishing universe of applicable stocks. In addition the number of companies 
monitored by Covalence in the beginning of the period was very low, therefore a 
portfolio containing less than 5% of ethical quote stocks would most likely deliver 
biased and scientifically insignificant results. Figure 3 shows how the number of 
observed companies has grown over time in each portfolio.  
 
Figure 3. The number of observed companies in the portfolios. 
 
In addition to the stringency portfolios, which represent the top ethical scorers, a 
portfolio was created to measure the performance of companies which may not have 
the highest total score, but which have significantly improved their ethically sound 
operations. The “Best Improvement Portfolio” represents the companies which have 
improved their score the most in respect to previous year’s score (for the first year the 
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score was reflected back to the first quarterly score). When examining the results, it 
appeared that no more than 10% of the companies had significantly improved their 
score, therefore it was decided that the portfolio would include the top 10% of 
improvers. Many previous studies suggest that unethical companies tend to 
outperform the market and for this reason a portfolio was also constructed to measure 
the performance of the bottom 10% SRI performers. Unlike in prior studies, The 
“Unethical Portfolio” does not have similar limitations as negative screening usually 
has, it is purely based on the Ethical Quote scores. 
 
In order to calculate the portfolio returns the daily stock quotes for all companies 
represented in the Ethical Quote database were derived from Thomson One Banker 
Analytics Database provided by the University Of Vaasa. The daily company returns 
were then calculated from the stock quotes using the arithmetic return method: 
 
                              
           
      
  
 
where      is the company   stock return,      is the closing price of the stock   in day   
and        is the previous trading day’s closing price. 
 
The daily portfolio returns were then calculated from the daily returns of individual 
stocks. Based on common practice it was decided that the portfolios would be 
quarterly adjusted. That is to say, the composition of each portfolio is amended 
according to the most recent Ethical Quote scores. For the sake of simplicity, it was 
assumed that there are no transaction costs. Within the quarter, each portfolio stock is 
held with a buy-and-hold approach, but as the composition of the portfolio changes 
also the weights of the stocks are rebalanced at the beginning of each quarter. Market 
capitalizations of the companies, however, do not have a weighting effect for the 
portfolios.  
 
A total of 4 companies were eliminated due to insufficient stock data. Several 
companies continued to be monitored by Covalence after their stock exchange had 
ended due to a merger, delisting or chapter-11 protection. From these companies only 
Sun Microsystems and General Motors would have affected the portfolios with a 
significant presence. Covalence also monitored Philip Morris International 
Incorporated from the beginning of 2002 although its stock was an Altria spin off only 
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from March 24, 2008. These ambiguities were taken into account in the composition of 
the portfolios. The Final sample consists of 236 companies of which 146 made a 
presence in at least one of the seven portfolios during the observation period. For the 
full list of US companies monitored by Covalence, please see appendix 2. 
 
Covalence Ethical Quote monitors the world’s biggest companies but this study limits 
the observations to the US stock markets. All of the companies are listed either in NYSE 
or NASDAQ and evidently represent the largest companies in the US. For this reason 
the value-weighted return on the whole US market (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) does 
not represent the sample in terms of composition and company size. Therefore it was 
decided that the S&P 500 index is used as the benchmark for the portfolios, as its 
composition is very much similar to the sample. Similarly to Fama-French studies, the 
risk free rate used in this study is the one-month Treasury bill rate. The benchmark and 
T-bill returns were also derived from Thomson One Banker Analytics Database 
provided by the University Of Vaasa. 
 
Finally the sample is divided into two distinctive periods in terms of market cycles. 
Period 1 extends from the 2nd quarter of 2002 until the end of the 3rd quarter of 2007. 
In the beginning of period 1, the US market is still in a downturn resulting from the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, but the markets take a turn in the last quarter of 2002 and 
continue to boom until the end of the period. Period 2 starts where period 1 left off, at 
the 4th quarter of 2007 and extends until the end of 2010. The second period is first 
marked by a descent due to the financial market disturbances which, in the last 
quarter of 2009, lead to a drastic stock market dive. In the end of the first quarter of 
2009 the market, however, takes a turn and first picks up rather quickly, but the pace 
slows down towards the end of the period. Each portfolio consists of 1398 observed 
daily returns in period 1 and 833 observed daily returns in period 2. 
5.3 Portfolio and data characteristics 
In regard to previous studies there are some oddities, concerning the sample, that do 
occur due to the selected approach. As the portfolios are constructed strictly based on 
Ethical Quote score, no additional screening practices are used. In result there are 19 
companies that visit both the top ethical performers’ portfolio and the unethical 
portfolio. Three of these companies would be screened out by most SRI funds and 
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indices and several others would not pass their qualitative screens. Another issue 
which separates these portfolios from SRI funds and indices is the lack of active 
portfolio management. Financial expectations do not play a part in the portfolio 
management, only past ethical performance does. Consequently, it can be expected 
that the portfolios follow the benchmark more closely and it would not come as a 
surprise if the results on the performance of the portfolios differ from previous studies 
on social screening. In fact this approach is closer to the best in class approach than 
traditional social screening, although they both tend to have active portfolio 
management on their side. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on the portfolios and S&P 500 Index 
Period 1 
  S&P P25 P20 P15 P10 P5 PBI PUE 
Observations 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 
Mean 0,025 % 0,025 % 0,020 % 0,024 % 0,023 % 0,030 % 0,017 % 0,047 % 
Median 0,059 % 0,039 % 0,036 % 0,029 % 0,030 % 0,045 % 0,038 % 0,075 % 
Standard Deviation 0,996 % 1,137 % 1,106 % 1,107 % 1,170 % 1,178 % 1,149 % 1,021 % 
Kurtosis 3,403 4,054 3,775 3,825 4,455 4,940 4,033 3,445 
Skewness 0,254 0,418 0,340 0,353 0,441 0,304 0,406 0,169 
Shapiro-Wilk 0,955*** 0,940*** 0,948*** 0,948*** 0,943*** 0,950*** 0,945*** 0,961*** 
Minimum -4,154 % -4,467 % -4,547 % -4,572 % -5,441 % -6,938 % -4,493 % -4,537 % 
Maximum 5,733 % 6,690 % 6,195 % 6,509 % 7,215 % 7,865 % 6,508 % 6,325 % 
Period 2 
  S&P P25 P20 P15 P10 P5 PBI PUE 
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 
Mean -0,006 % 0,003 % 0,005 % 0,002 % 0,002 % -0,004 % 0,011 % 0,007 % 
Median 0,074 % 0,043 % 0,068 % 0,044 % 0,058 % 0,053 % 0,079 % 0,035 % 
Standard Deviation 1,851 % 1,801 % 1,863 % 1,916 % 1,930 % 1,998 % 1,794 % 2,094 % 
Kurtosis 6,268 4,679 4,588 4,438 4,101 4,067 4,769 4,964 
Skewness 0,057 0,124 0,114 0,151 0,121 0,176 0,305 -0,063 
Shapiro-Wilk 0,911*** 0,931*** 0,931*** 0,932*** 0,938*** 0,940*** 0,938*** 0,933*** 
Minimum -9,035 % -8,090 % -8,671 % -8,418 % -8,080 % -8,550 % -7,701 % -10,148 % 
Maximum 11,580 % 10,659 % 10,759 % 10,961 % 11,013 % 11,484 % 11,097 % 12,964 % 
 
 
Now let us take a closer look at the sample and the descriptive statistics of each 
portfolio. In periods 1 and 2, each portfolio consists of 1398 and 833 observed daily 
returns respectively. All descriptive statistics presented for the portfolios in table 3 are 
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also computed from daily returns. The arithmetic mean is the sum of the daily returns 
divided by the number of observations. The arithmetic mean is a simple estimate of 
the average daily portfolio returns. Median is the numerical value separating the 
higher half of the daily returns from the lower half. A positive median implies that 
most daily returns have a positive value as it is the case for all portfolios in both 
periods. The standard deviation measures how widely the values of the sample 
disperse from the mean. Basically the standard deviation is a measure of portfolio risk 
and is more often presented in an annualized form, in table 3 the standard deviation is 
presented for daily returns. Kurtosis and skewness are measures that describe the 
distribution of the sample. Kurtosis portrays the relative peakedness or flatness of the 
sample distribution compared to normal distribution. When kurtosis delivers a value of 
zero, the sample peak is leveled with symmetric standard deviation. Negative kurtosis 
would imply flatness, but table 3 shows that all portfolios deliver positive values in 
both periods. This means that the distribution of returns has a relatively higher peak 
and a thinner deviation compared to normal distribution.  
 
The symmetry of the sample deviation is characterized by skewness. A perfectly 
symmetric deviation has skewness zero, a negative value of skewness is tilted on the 
left side in comparison to normal distribution. All portfolios, however deliver positive 
values which indicates a distribution with an asymmetric tail extending toward more 
positive values. The normality of the distribution is also measured with the Shapiro-
Wilk test, which compares the sample values against the normal distribution. The test 
implies that none of the portfolio samples are normally distributed (*** = alpha level 
of 0,01). The minimum and maximum are the extreme values of each data set. 
(Heikkilä 2004: 82 – 89.) 
 
 
  
57 
 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a graphic illustration of the sample. It shows the histogram on the 
dispersion of daily returns for each portfolio as well as the S&P 500 index. The figure 
also shows the normal distribution curve computed from the whole sample. Both 
periods seem to have some skewness and kurtosis, although considerably more in 
period 2. We can also note that the scale of the returns is significantly larger in period 
2.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of the daily returns for the portfolios and S&P 500 Index.  
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6. METHODOLOGY 
Risk and return are the two critical components underlying all investment decisions. 
One of the most important contributions of academic finance theory is that risk and 
return are essentially the same element viewed from different sides. The phenomenon 
is known as the “Risk-Return Tradeoff”, which in generalized terms means that 
potential returns rise with an increase in risk. The balance between risk and return is 
what makes all the difference, highly risky investments may produce high returns only 
if the risk does not materialize. For this reason the risk and return of the portfolios are 
first analyzed individually from an ex-post perspective. Next the portfolios are 
subjected to a regression analysis in order to find out the Beta and Alpha coefficients 
and sensitivities to different factors. After this, the risk and return components are 
combined and the performance of the portfolios is calculated for five risk-adjusted 
performance metrics. Finally the possible effects of industries are investigated. 
6.1 Portfolio risk and return 
The daily returns of the portfolios serve as a basis for all calculations. However the 
daily returns were not directly applicable for every calculation and therefore they were 
extended to monthly and yearly returns by cumulating the daily returns. Also in order 
to have a graphic illustration, the cumulative returns were also calculated for holding 
periods 1 and 2. The formula for cumulative returns is as follows: 
 
                                           
  
   
   
 
   
      
 
Where   is the number of observation and    is the  -th return 
 
Although the portfolio returns indicate how much profit was on offer, it is also 
important to know how much risk they carry. Volatility is a measure of risk closely 
related to the capital asset pricing model. It indicates the dispersion of returns for a 
given portfolio or security. In common terms, the higher the volatility, the riskier the 
portfolio. In this study the volatility has been calculated from the daily returns and is 
then annualized. The annualized volatility is calculated for each month separately and 
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for both observation periods overall. The formula for portfolio volatility is as follows 
(Nikkinen et al. 2002: 211.): 
 
                                                
 
   
         
 
   
 
 
Where    is the return of a given portfolio on day,   is the number of observations and 
   is the mean return. 
 
Another gauge of risk is the tracking error. It measures how loosely the portfolio return 
follows the benchmark index return. Tracking error is defined as the time-series 
standard deviation of the difference between a fund return and its benchmark. High 
tracking error indicates that the portfolio returns have deviated a lot from the returns 
of the benchmark index. Tracking error increases when the portfolio holdings start to 
differ from the benchmark holdings. A tracking error of 5% means that the returns 
deviate 5% from the benchmark returns. If a portfolio contains exactly the same 
securities as the benchmark, then the tracking error for is 0%. The tracking error in this 
study has been calculated from monthly returns, its formula is as follows (Bodie et al. 
2009, 929 – 930.): 
 
                                       
 
   
          
 
   
 
 
Where     is the return for a given portfolio on month   in excess of the return of the 
benchmark index in month  ,    is the mean of     in the observation period and   is 
the number of observations. 
 
The two most common reasons for tracking error are the attempt to outperform the 
benchmark by active portfolio management and the passive replication of the 
benchmark. In this study the portfolios are not actively managed, but rather socially 
responsible sub-portfolios of the benchmark and for this reason they should mimic it. 
However passive portfolio management per se usually refers to automated transaction 
systems, so to that extent passive management does not correspond to the portfolios 
examined in this study either. Nonetheless, a high tracking error indicates that the 
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portfolio return has varied extensively in relation to the benchmark return. 
Correspondingly, a low tracking error indicates that the portfolio and benchmark 
returns are very much similar. The magnitude of tracking error should be directly 
related to the extent of volatility of the stocks comprising the index. (Ammann & 
Tobler, 2000.) 
 
Transaction costs, portfolio cash flows and the application of dividends are factors 
often related to the appearance of tracking error, however these factors are excluded 
from the study. Another possible reason is in the different composition between the 
portfolios and the benchmark. S&P P500 Index is market capitalization weighted, 
which means that the amount of each stock held in the index fluctuates depending on 
the proportion of the market capitalization of the stock relative to total market 
capitalization of the index. Conversely, the stocks in the portfolios are equally 
weighted and quarterly balanced according to the latest Ethical Quote score. Yet, the 
most likely reason for the possible appearance of tracking error in this study is the lack 
of diversification in the portfolios. In accordance with assumptions of the modern 
portfolio theory the stringency of screening limits the universe of available investment 
opportunities and therefore affects the riskiness of the portfolio. (Frino & Gallagher, 
2001.) 
6.2 Regression analysis 
The regression analysis is a statistical method with a fundamental purpose of analyzing 
the relationship and dependence between specified variables. The analysis is used to 
determine the variability of a dependent variable     through its sensitivity to one or 
more independent variables. A simple regression model contains only one 
independent variable    , when a multiple regression contains more than one 
independent variable. The analysis is carried out through the estimation of a 
relationship of the variables. Formula 8 presents a common multiple regression model 
with   independent variables (Wooldridge 2009: 71 – 75, 89.): 
                                                
Where   is a dependent variable,    is a constant term,       are coefficients, 
      are independent variables, and    is an error term. 
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The results of a regression analysis serve two purposes, they show how much the 
dependent variable ( ) changes in respect to the independent variables (     ) and 
they allow to make prediction and forecasts of   based on      . However the 
results regarding the regression variables have no use if the model is flawed, therefore 
the results also indicate whether the selected model is applicable to begin with.  
The beta coefficients         are used to describe the relation between the 
movements of the dependent variable and the independent variables in the model. In 
this study the dependent variables are the SRI portfolios and the Unethical portfolio 
whereas the independent variables are the S&P index (as a proxy for the market) and 
SMB & HML –factors (from the 3-factor model). A positive beta coefficient indicates 
that the portfolio and the independent variables generally move to the same direction 
and a negative beta indicates an inverse relation. A beta coefficient of 1.0 indicates 
that the portfolio has the same risk profile as the factor in question. The main 
advantage of the beta coefficient is that it is easy to interpret. If the beta is higher than 
1.0 the portfolio is riskier than the benchmark and vice-versa. However as the beta is 
calculated from ex post data, the disadvantage is that it tells very little about the 
attractiveness or the value of the portfolio in the future. (Wooldridge 2009, 187 – 188.) 
The precision of the estimates can be measured with standard error (  ). The error 
term provides a general indication of the likely accuracy of the regression parameters. 
It is basically the measure of the degree of uncertainty in the estimated values for the 
coefficients. Therefore a small standard error indicates that the coefficients are likely 
to be precise on average, but not how precise they are. (Brooks 2008, 46 – 47.) 
 
The estimation results of a linear regression model also produce measures which help 
in defining the models utility. R-square (R²), also known as the coefficient of 
determination, is used to evaluate a model’s explanatory power or goodness-of-fit. It is 
basically the correlation between the dependent variable (portfolio) and the 
independent variables (market, SMB & HML –factors). Every model is able to explain a 
certain amount of the total variability of the dependent variable, R-square expresses 
this amount in percentage. The closer R-square gets to 1 (or 100%), the better the 
explanatory power of the model. Correspondingly, a low R-square states that very few 
of the portfolio’s movements are explained by the factors. Adjusted R-square takes 
into consideration the number of independent variables and is therefore a better 
measure for multifactor models if added variables are able to increase the goodness-
of-fit. (Brooks 2008, 106 – 111; Wooldridge 2009, 199 – 201.) It is also necessary to 
determine whether the coefficient values are significant enough to have explanatory 
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value. The t-ratio is a common significance test, basically it is the calculated ratio of the 
coefficient to its standard error. In order to make judgment on significance, the ratio 
has to be compared with appropriate critical values from a t-distribution. The critical 
values, or significance levels, for a two-sided test are commonly 10%, 5% and 1%. 
(Brooks 2008, 65 – 66.) The basic assumption of the OLS regression is that the errors 
do not correlate with one another. If they do, the model may be biased by 
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test measures the first order autocorrelation. It 
provides a value between 0 and 4, if it the value is close to 2, there is very little 
autocorrelations in residuals, however a considerable deviation from 2 indicates its 
presence. (Brooks 2008, 144 – 147.) 
 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression driven Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
is the most common regression model used in stock market analysis. The beta 
coefficient delivered by the CAPM model implies the sensitivity of the studied portfolio 
to the market portfolio. If the portfolio is able to create abnormal excess return, the 
equation gets an additional intercept term called the Jensen’s alpha. (Jensen, 1968.) 
The alpha coefficient      as such is the constant term in a market model regression. 
In finance it is determined as the intercept of the security market line (see chapter 
3.2). The following CAPM equation is used for regression analysis in this study: 
 
                                                 
where,     is the portfolio return in trading day  ,     is the market portfolio 
(S&P500) return for day  ,     is the 1 month Treasury bill return for day   and acts as a 
proxy for the risk free rate. 
However the CAPM is a simple regression model with only the risk-adjusted market 
return as the independent variable. CAPM is derived from the implications of the 
modern portfolio theory (see chapter 3.2) and it has been criticized due to its 
assumption on systematic risk. It has later been proven that the efficient market 
conditions do not usually apply. Therefore CAPM results may be biased. (Bodie et al. 
2009, 297.)  
Many SRI studies which utilize time-series regression have chosen multifactor models 
instead. Multifactor models increase the explanatory power of the regression model 
because they assume that several factors affect the returns.  One of these models is 
the Fama-French three factor model which was created in 1992 as a result of the 
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research paper “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns” by Fama and French. 
Similarly to CAPM the Fama-French model also includes the market return premium, 
but also two other factors based on well known market anomalies, these factors are 
the small size premium       and the high book-to-market premium     . 
Empirical evidence indicate that historical-average returns of small firms and firms 
with high Book-to-market ratios are higher than predicted by the security market line 
of CAPM. In other words the evidence suggests that CAPM does not take into account 
all sources of systematic risk, which in this case are size and book-to-market –factors. 
In this study the Fama-French 3-factor model is utilized to test stock market efficiency 
and to ensure that possible abnormal returns are not caused by risk factors. Each 
factor acts as a proxy for systematic risk, and therefore the alpha should be reduced in 
comparison to CAPM if     and     -factors have explanatory power in the model. 
(Bodie et al. 2009, 423 – 424; Lakonishok et al. 1994.) 
The applied Fama-French model used in this study is presented as follows: 
                                                                
where,     is the portfolio return in trading day  ,     is the market portfolio 
(S&P500) return for day  ,     is the 1 month Treasury bill return for day   and acts as a 
proxy for the risk free rate,      is the return on small firms minus the return on big 
firms in day  ,      is the return on high book-to-market firms minus the low book-
to-market firms in day  . 
 
The     and     -factors have been derived from Kenneth French’s data library 
(2012) and they are constructed using 6 value-weight portfolios formed on size and 
book-to-market. The     -factor is the return of small company portfolios minus the 
return of big company portfolios. Small companies are the ones that are under the 
median in market value and big companies the ones that are above the median. The 
    -factor is the return of high book-to-market portfolios (representing value stocks) 
minus the return of low book-to-market portfolios (representing growth stocks). High 
book-to-market companies are the ones that have the top 1/3 book-to-market ratios 
of the portfolio, conversely the low ratio group is the one with 1/3 lowest value. (Bodie 
et al. 2009, 424.) 
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6.3 Risk-adjusted performance metrics 
Although simple return metrics provide information on how well an investment does 
on a specified period, it is not a very useful measure of performance. Risk-adjusted 
performance metrics take into account the risk that was taken in order to achieve 
these returns, therefore they allow a more meaningful comparison between portfolios. 
The most common measures of risk-adjusted performance are Jensen’s Alpha, Sharpe 
ratio, Treynor ratio and Information ratio. However, it must be noted that the 
measures have encountered resistance due to some of their inherent problems. The 
rankings provided by these measures may be misleading if the portfolio characteristics 
are not comparable. The metrics are based on ex-post data so before they can be used 
for ex-ante decision making, they require a certain amount of data and time. The risk-
adjusted performance metrics are useful measures, but each of them should be 
assessed according to the underlying circumstances. Investors should also be wary of 
investments, which are promoted by a single performance metric. (Bodie et al. 2009, 
825 – 826; Friend & Blume 1970.) 
6.3.1 Jensen’s Alpha 
Jensen’s Alpha is a common CAPM-based performance metric. It depicts the risk-
adjusted performance of a portfolio, in other words it is the return in excess of the 
compensation for the risk. The null hypothesis of the CAPM is that the constant term, 
or Jensen’s alpha, is zero. However in reality this is hardly ever the case. An Alpha 
which differs from zero implies either a problem in the market valuation or a problem 
in the model. Usually the model fails to take into account all measurable risk factors. In 
finance Alpha may also indicate outperformance or underperformance in respect to 
the market risk. A positive Alpha implies that the investment has performed better 
than could have been expected based on the Beta of the investment. (Vaihekoski 2004, 
207.) 
 
Originally Jensen’s Alpha was developed to evaluate the skill of active fund managers 
in stock picking. Successful active management and financial engineering may improve 
the Alpha of a portfolio without adversely affecting the Beta. In accordance to the 
CAPM, Jensen’s Alpha is defined by the following equation: 
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where    is the expected portfolio return,     is the risk-free rate,   is the portfolio 
Beta, and    is the market return.  
 
According to Jensen (1968) his model should imply how well the portfolio manager can 
predict future security prices. He also notes that the concept of portfolio performance 
has two distinct dimensions: The ability to successfully predict future security prices 
and the ability to minimize risk through efficient diversification. The model, however, 
does not take efficient diversification into account because the risk premium is based 
on systematic risk. Jensen’s Alpha has also received other criticism. If the capital asset 
pricing model is not the correct equilibrium model, Jensen’s model delivers flawed 
indicators. In addition the model does not help to recognize the relation between the 
performance and the information which drives it. Many studies also reveal that 
Jensen’s Alpha often delivers a high variation in standard error and it seems that 
statistical tests struggle to affirm its significance. (Jensen 1968; Sauer 1997.) 
6.3.2 Sharpe ratio 
Sharpe ratio, also known as the reward-to-variability ratio, is probably the most 
common risk-adjusted performance metric because the ratio is very simple and easy to 
compute. Sharpe ratio also measures the risk-adjusted performance of a portfolio, but 
it is measured by volatility. Volatility, or standard deviation, is a measure of the total 
risk of the portfolio, in other words it takes into account both the systematic (market) 
and non-systematic (firm-specific) risks. According to Sauer (1997) Sharpe ratio is a 
more appropriate measure of risk exposure when it comes to socially responsible 
investing, because it calculates the total risk instead of the market risk. Since screening 
may restrict the investment universe, SRI portfolios may unintentionally subject 
themselves to otherwise diversifiable risk. (Sharpe 1966; Sauer 1997.) 
 
Sharpe ratio can be calculated by dividing the average risk-adjusted returns with the 
standard deviation of the returns. A higher Sharpe ratio indicates a better performance 
on a risk-adjusted basis, however similarly to other risk-adjusted metrics the ratio 
should be compared to benchmark. The equation for Sharpe ratio is as follows: 
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Where    is the return of the portfolio,     is the risk-free return and    is the 
standard deviation of the portfolio return over risk-free return. 
 
Because the risk premium is described by the volatility of the portfolio, Sharpe ratio 
does not share the weaknesses related to the capital asset pricing model. However, 
also Sharpe ratio has been criticized. The volatility is a somewhat problematic risk 
measure, because it may deliver severely biased results if the returns are not normally 
distributed. The standard deviation also fails to observe whether the returns vary 
bellow or above average returns, hence it inherently discriminates returns which are 
above average. Sharpe ratio may also deliver biased results if the investment strategy 
changes during the observation period. For instance the ratio may be the same for two 
consecutive years if they are calculated separately, but significantly different if the 
observation period is extended to cover both years. When it comes to professionally 
managed portfolios this problem often arises when economic cycles shift.  (Bodie et al. 
2009: 735 – 737.) 
6.3.3 Modified Shape ratio 
The standard Sharpe ratio is an appropriate measure only if the returns are normally-
distributed. In normally distributed samples the entire distribution can be well 
summarized through the mean and the variance. However many modern investment 
vehicles, such as hedge funds and bonds, display fat-tailed returns, in which there is 
the potential for extreme losses. In these situations, the standard Sharpe ratio 
underestimates risk and should not be used. Favre and Galeano (2002) have modified 
Sharpe’s original measure by eliminating the limitations regarding the shape of the 
sample distribution. The potential for extreme losses can be quantified through the 
modified Value at Risk, which takes into account the skewness and kurtosis of the 
returns distribution. Favre & Galeano were able to demonstrate that volatility can be 
used as a risk premium even when the sample is not normally distributed. The 
standard Sharpe ratio is the risk-adjusted return divided by the standard deviation.  
However, the modified Sharpe ratio is the risk-adjusted return divided by the modified 
Value at Risk, and is defined by the following equations (Favre & Galeano 2002.): 
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Where    is the return of the portfolio,      is the risk-free return,    is the 
mean return and    is the standard deviation of   
                              
 
 
   
      
 
  
   
        
 
  
    
       
   
Where   is the skewness,   is the kurtosis,    is the quantile of the distribution and   
is the Cornish-Fisher asymptotic expansion for the quantile of a non-gaussian 
distribution. For a detailed derivation of the Cornish-Fisher expansion formula, please 
see Cornish & Fisher (1937). 
6.3.4 Treynor ratio 
Treynor ratio, also known as reward-to-volatility ratio, was the first risk-adjusted 
performance metric and it was introduced in 1965. Treynor ratio is very much similar 
to Shape ratio, they both divide the effective return by the risk. However they differ on 
the risk factor. Whereas Sharpe ratio uses the total risk, Treynor ratio is based on the 
CAPM applying the beta coefficient which measures only the systematic risk of the 
portfolio. Treynor ratio is also used to characterize how well the portfolio’s riskiness is 
compensated by the return, hence, it indicates the performance on a risk-adjusted 
basis. The equation for Treynor ratio is as follows (Treynor 1965.): 
 
                                       
       
 
 
Where    is the return of the portfolio,     is the risk-free return and    is the 
sensitivity to the benchmark, or the beta coefficient. 
 
The main advantage of Treynor ratio is that it indicates the volatility a stock brings to 
an entire portfolio.  If the portfolio is well diversified Sharpe and Treynor ratios should 
produce similar results, however if a portfolio lacks efficient diversification it may 
produce biased results. The reason for this lies in the CAPM derived risk component, 
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which fails to track all necessary information. Another problem associated with 
Treynor ratio is its relation to the selected benchmark. Since the beta coefficient 
represents the sensitivity to a benchmark, different benchmarks naturally generate 
different beta coefficients. In general, Treynor ratio should only be used as a ranking 
mechanism for similar investments. (Friend & Blume 1970; Modigliani & Modigliani 
1997.) 
6.3.5 Information ratio 
The Information ratio, also known as the Appraisal ratio, is a risk-reward benchmark 
that is used to quantify the performance of an investment. Information ratio is often 
used to represent how efficiently the portfolio generates active returns relative to the 
amount of risk taken. It also measures the portfolio manager’s ability to generate 
excess returns relative to the benchmark. Information ratio utilizes the tracking error 
as the risk component. It is equal to the average excess returns divided by the standard 
deviation of the excess returns. The equation for the Information ratio is as follows 
(Goodwin 1998.):  
                                            
        
           
 
where    is the return for the portfolio,    is the benchmark index return and 
            is the tracking error between the fund and the benchmark index 
Similarly to other performance metrics, the Information ratio can be used to rank 
similar investments, however negative Information ratios can be misleading and 
should not be used. For portfolios which produce similar values for Jensen’s Alpha and 
Treynor ratio, a higher Information Ratio indicates a better managed portfolio with 
superior stock picking. However, this is only valid if the portfolio and the selected 
benchmark have a strong correlation. A high Information ratio also indicates that the 
portfolio manager can achieve higher returns more efficiently than a manager with 
lower Information ratio by taking additional risk. It is also often used to monitor the 
consistency of the portfolio performance. (Goodwin 1998.) 
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6.4 The effect of industries 
The effect of industries on socially responsible investing has been much disregarded in 
previous studies. However company stocks are often valued in respect to their peers 
and naturally companies positioned in the same industry tend to behave similarly. In 
order to investigate what kind of sensitivities SRI portfolios have towards industries it 
is first essential to define a set of industry specifications. Covalence uses a division into 
18 sectors following the Dow Jones Sector Titans classification. However for the 
purpose of analyzing the industry-specific sensitivity of a portfolio, this classification is 
not entirely appropriate. The classification into 18 sectors is too broad considering the 
number of observations. Therefore such a division would most certainly lead to biased 
and insignificant results. Additionally there is no return data available for these sector 
portfolios, hence, the division was reorganized following one of Kenneth French’s 
classification. Considering the economic conditions during the observation period, it 
was held important to include the financial sector as one specific industry. The division 
includes 11 specified sectors and one additional “sector” which covers all companies 
that do not fit in any of the specified ones. The industry of each company was then 
determined according to its primary SIC-code as filed with the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission. All information regarding the industry portfolios are 
obtained from the Kenneth French’s Data Library (2012). 
 
The next step was to calculate the ethical score for each industry. The Ethical Quote 
score provided by Covalence represents the cumulative score for each company in 
question. Calculating averages from the cumulative score would have distorted the 
outcome, for previous ethical performance play a crucial part in later scores. Therefore 
calculating the quarterly score for each company gives a more precise result. The 
quarterly score for a company is calculated from the cumulative score using the 
following pattern: 
 
                                            
 
Where       is the quarterly company score for a given quarter,       is the 
cumulative company score for the quarter and         is the cumulative company 
score for the previous quarter. 
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The quarterly score for a given industry is then calculated as the arithmetic mean of all 
observed companies in that specific sector.  
                            
 
 
     
 
   
 
Where     is the quarterly industry score,   is the number of observed companies in 
each quarter and    is the quarterly company score. 
 
A problem regarding the industry score for the whole observation period arises from 
the fact that the number of observations has accrued over time. For this reason it 
might be important to add a weighing factor when calculating the average. However 
after careful consideration it became clear that people making decision based on the 
score were to rely on the information that was available for them at the time and 
hence, had no knowledge to what extent Covalence would grow their universe of 
observed companies in the future. For this reason the score for each quarter is valued 
equally and the number of observations is disregarded. Hence, the score for 
observation periods 1 & 2 were calculated using a simple arithmetic mean of the 
quarterly industry scores. 
 
                             
 
 
     
 
   
 
Where     is the industry score for the period,   is the number of quarters in the 
period and    is the quarterly industry score. 
 
The next step was to create a correlation matrix between the SRI portfolios and the 
industry portfolios. The correlation measures the degree of linear association between 
two variables. In other words it depicts how related the movements of the two 
variables are on average. It is not as an effective tool as linear regression, but provides 
indicative information on the dependence between portfolios. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is probably the most common measure of correlation. It is calculated with 
the following formula: 
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Where   and   are the sample means,    and    are the sample standard deviations 
The value of the correlation coefficient varies between -1 and +1. If the coefficient is 0, 
there is no linear dependence between variables. Values -1 and +1 indicate perfect 
negative and positive dependence respectively. The significance of the correlation 
coefficient can also be tested the same way as for regression coefficients. Therefore 
the t-ratio is used also for Pearson’s correlation. (Brooks 2008, 28.) 
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter the empirical results are presented and discussed. The results are 
presented in a similar order as the methodologies, starting from simple return and risk 
and moving on to regression analysis, performance metrics and industry effects. The 
results are presented in tables and figures, which are divided into the two distinctive 
periods examined in this study. In some cases the stringency portfolios are presented 
together and the Best Improvement and Unethical –portfolios are presented 
separately for comparison purposes. The results are also discussed in writing and 
according to the findings the hypotheses (presented in chapter 1.2) are either 
accepted or rejected. 
7.1 Cumulative returns 
The cumulative returns of the portfolios have been calculated for both periods and are 
presented in figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 shows the cumulative return curves of portfolios 
P25, P20, P15, P10 and P5 with respect to the benchmark. In period 1 we can first note 
that all portfolios performed as well or even better than S&P 500 index until the end of 
2003. It seems that socially responsible companies picked up quickly after the drop 
they suffered due to 9/11, but after 2003 their stock growth slowed down. By the end 
of the period only portfolio P5, which produced a 37,27% return, outperformed the 
S&P 500 index, which reached a 33,06% return. The lowest return was denoted for 
portfolio P20 with only 22,18% for the period. In period 2, however, the results are 
quite opposite. Nearly all portfolios reached higher returns than S&P 500 index, only 
portfolio P5 suffered a last-minute drop which placed it under the benchmark. 
However all portfolios had negative cumulative returns by the end of the period. The 
figure also shows that the stock market crash hit the SRI portfolios harder than the 
benchmark, but that their recovery was faster. In the second period the highest 
cumulative return was measured for portfolio P20 with a return of -9,62%. S&P 500 
index produced a return of -17,36% and P5 obtained the lowest return of the period, -
18,15%. 
Figure 6. shows the cumulative return curves for the Best Improvement portfolio, the 
Unethical portfolio, the 1-month T-bill and the S&P500 index.  At first we can observe 
that in period 1 the Unethical portfolio produced very high returns, with 78,63% by the 
end of the period.  
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Figure 5. The cumulative daily returns of the stringency portfolios in respect to the 
benchmark. 
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Figure 6. The cumulative daily returns of the Unethical and Best Improvement 
portfolios in respect to the benchmark and the risk-free rate. 
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Up until the end of 2003 all 3 portfolios followed a very similar trend after which the 
unethical portfolio started its fast growth while the Best Improvement portfolio 
started to lag behind the S&P 500 Index. The cumulative T-bill return shows that the 
government kept the rates at a very low level long after 9/11, and that only after 2004 
investors were able to get proper returns from T-bills.  It seems that the Best 
Improvement portfolio did not fully recover from the bear market resulting from 9/11 
and by the end of the period it had produced only a 14,99% return, which is less than 
any other portfolio or the T-bill (15,84%) for that matter. When observing the returns 
in period 2, it seems that the stock market dive affects all portfolios quite similarly. The 
distinctions between the portfolio returns appear after the market turns. 
Unexpectedly, the Best Improvement portfolio recovers the quickest. In 2010 the 
double dip seems to have most effect on the unethical portfolio. Again the T-bill rate 
reflects the government’s actions regarding the recession. By the end of 2008 the rate 
is lowered to a level where no actual returns can be expected, nevertheless, the T-bill 
produces the highest cumulative returns for period 2. The Best Improvement portfolio 
has the best cumulative return in period 2 with -4,42% while the unethical portfolio 
produced -11,60%. 
 
The findings especially concerning the unethical portfolio are unexpected. Prior 
literature would suggest that the bear market would be best suited for companies 
which are considered unethical. Despite this the unethical portfolio produced 
phenomenal returns in the bull market defeating all SRI portfolios and the market. 
However in the bear market the portfolio was barely able to defeat the market and 3 
of the SRI portfolios produced higher returns. Some of the SRI portfolios were able to 
defeat the market in both periods, but the evidence seems to suggest that although 
socially responsible companies recover quickly from downturns, they tend to 
underperform in steadier times. 
7.2 Portfolio risk 
The portfolio risk is investigated through two different measures, volatility and 
tracking error. Figure 7 depicts the annualized volatility for each month of the two 
observation periods. First we can observe that the beginning of the period was fairly 
volatile for each of the portfolios. The volatility peak of the period was measured for 
portfolio P15 in November 2002. 
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Figure 7. Annualized volatility for all seven portfolios and the benchmark.  
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From the figure we can also observe that all portfolios have a very similar volatility 
trend as the S&P 500 index. By the end of 2003 the market seems to calm down as the 
volatility descends to 10% – 20% levels. In period 2 the volatility starts to rise again as 
the market uncertainty increases due to the unraveling of the financial crisis. The 
volatility peaks in November 2008 for all portfolios with levels over 70%, the highest 
volatility is measured for the unethical portfolio with 95,13%. We may also note that 
after the peak the market starts to calm, but the S&P index no longer has the lowest 
volatility when compared to other portfolios.  
If we take a closer look at the overall volatility of the portfolios, we find that the 
market cycles seem to disrupt the risk profiles of the portfolios. Figure 8 presents the 
overall annualized volatility of the stringency portfolios for periods 1 and 2. We may 
first note that in the first period there seems to be a curvilinear relationship between 
volatility and screening stringency. This relationship seems to be consistent with the 
findings of Lee et al. (2010), however in the second period the phenomenon no longer 
occurs. It seems that the level of total risk in period 2 increases at an almost linear 
fashion when compared to screening stringency. Lee et al., in their study, intensify 
screening by adding more specific screens on the portfolios, which makes their 
approach somewhat different. Another possible explanation for the difference 
between periods is that the market uncertainty in the second period transformed the 
risk profiles of the portfolios. Indeed from figure 8 we may see that the overall 
volatility levels in period 2 are nearly double from period 1. 
    
 
Figure 8. The impact of screening stringency on annualized portfolio volatility. 
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The S&P 500 index, which act as proxy for the market portfolio, delivers the second 
lowest overall volatility (15,82%) for period 1. In the second period the volatility 
reaches 29,39%, which is higher than for portfolio P25 (28,58%) and the best 
improvement portfolio (28,48%). In period 1 the best improvement portfolio has a 
volatility of 18,24%. The lowest volatility of the first period was measured for the 
unethical portfolio (15,82%) However in period 2 the unethical portfolio delivered by 
far the highest volatility (33,24%). The finding is quite intriguing since investing in vice 
has been marketed as “recession-proof”.  
Figure 9. The Impact of screening stringency on the tracking error of monthly returns. 
 
The Ex post tracking error measures the active risk of the portfolios past returns. 
Figure 9 shows how the screening stringency affects the tracking error of monthly 
returns. We may note that the tracking error increases together with the screening 
stringency. From the figure we can also observe that the tracking error in period 2 is 
relatively higher than in period 1. Evidently the market was much more volatile in the 
second period, which may explain the higher tracking error. It seems that the level of 
tracking error is fairly stable when social screening is limited to 25% and 20% of the 
total portfolio. The level starts to increase when 15% of the sample is screened. In 
period 2 it even seems that the tracking error increases at an accelerating rate when 
the screens become more stringent. It would be interesting to see whether this trend 
would continue for even stringier screens, but unfortunately the sample size does not 
allow this without significantly distorting the results. The highest tracking error for the 
SRI portfolios, is measured for portfolio P5 in periods 1 (2,66%) and 2 (4,10%). 
79 
 
 
 
However the unethical portfolio measures the highest tracking error (4,44%) of all the 
portfolios in period 2, while its tracking error in period 1 is the lowest (1,81%). The 
tracking error for the Best Improvement portfolio is 1,97% in period 1 and 3,02% for 
period 2. The results are slightly lower than those measured for portfolio P10, which 
has the same number of observations as the Best Improvement portfolio.  
 
It is important to note that simple measures of risk must be evaluated together with 
other information regarding the portfolios and are hence only one of the elements of 
portfolio performance. Sauer (1997) observed that volatility, which measures total risk, 
is a more effective measure of SRI portfolio risk in comparison to unsystematic risk. 
Volatility is also an important reference of market uncertainty. Evidently figure 8 
depicts the market turmoil in general, rather than the riskiness of a specific portfolio. If 
we take a look at how screening stringency affects the portfolio riskiness we have 
mixed results. Nonetheless, the results do indicate that after a certain point additional 
screening can only heighten the total risk. It also seems that adequate diversification is 
especially necessary when the whole market is in a volatile state.  
 
Tracking error, on the other hand, points out the fluctuations in respect to the market. 
Although it seems that screening stringency is not the only factor to have an effect on 
tracking error, it undeniably is an important one. The study has been conducted in a 
manner in which the number of observations for the most stringent portfolios is rather 
small. The decreasing number of observations surely has an effect on tracking error. 
Then again the overall tracking error in period 1 is lower although the number of 
observations in period 1 is relatively smaller than in period 2. This would suggest that 
the bias resulting from the sample size is not very significant.  
 
All in all the results imply that at approximately 15% the tracking error starts to 
increase more sharply (Point A in figure 1). The number of observed companies in 
these portfolios is 12 or less in the beginning of period 1 and 35 or less by the end of 
period 2. It also seems that from that point on the level of volatility only grows. 
Evidently the subject would require a more detailed analysis before direct conclusion 
can be drawn. However, based on the findings the hypothesis    can be confirmed. 
More stringent screens do result in a greater level of portfolio risk.  
80 
 
 
 
7.3 Regression analysis   
This chapter presents the results gained by implying CAPM and 3-factor regression 
models and tests on the calculated daily returns. Tables 4 – 7 present the regression 
results for all seven portfolios. “Alpha α” is the constant coefficient in the regression 
analysis and operates as a risk-adjusted performance benchmark in the models.  Alpha 
indicates by how much the daily returns of the portfolio are above or below market 
returns. “Annualized α” represents the alpha coefficient in an annualized form. The 
beta (β) coefficient denotes the sensitivity of the portfolio to the factor in question. 
The statistical significance of the results are reviewed in the significance levels of 1 %, 5 
% and 10 % (marked by ***, ** and * respectively) and the t-ratio, which is in 
parentheses. “Adj. R²” is the adjusted R², it describes the explanatory power of the 
model. “Durbin-Watson” is a test which detects the presence of autocorrelation. All 
results are attained with Gretl 1.9.6 Econometrics Software. 
  
Table 4. CAPM regression results for period 1. 
 
Table 4 presents the CAPM regression results for period 1. We can first note that there 
is a positive alpha (3,71E-05 and 2,23E-0,4 respectively) only for the Top 5% -portfolio 
(P5) and the unethical portfolio (UE), however the t-ratio reveals that the result is 
significant at a 5% -level for UE (1,9876), but not significant for P5 (0,2414). Another 
Annualized α Adj. R² Durbin-Watson
-1,72E-05 1,0860 ***
-5,83E-05 1,0583 ***
-2,06E-05 1,0522 ***
-3,77E-05 1,0804 ***
3,71E-05 1,0328 ***
-9,94E-05 1,0757 ***
2,23E-04 ** 0,9340 ***
Alpha α Rm-Rf β
UE
P25
P20
P15
P10
P5
BI
(-0,8951)
(1,9876)
(115,1335)
(118,0362)
(109,8057)
(87,5427)
(66,9936)
(96,4955)
(82,9192)
-0,43 %
-1,47 %
-0,52 %
-0,95 %
0,93 %
-2,50 %
5,62 %
(-0,1834)
(-0,6525)
(-0,2156)
(-0,3069)
(0,2414)
86,95 %
83,11 %
2,0625
2,0154
2,1014
2,1587
2,0316
2,0747
1,9374
90,47 %
90,89 %
89,62 %
84,58 %
76,26 %
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important observation is that the CAPM beta is greater than 1 for all portfolios except 
the unethical portfolio, this implies a higher level of systematic risk for SRI-portfolios. 
Adjusted R² indicates that the model has a fairly high level of explanatory power, 
although the level decreases for portfolios which have fewer observations. 
 
Table 5. Fama-French 3-factor model regression results for period 1. 
 
Table 5 present the Fama-French 3-factor regression results also for period 1. At first 
we can observe that the explanatory power or the model is slightly higher than that of 
the CAPM. The Durbin-Watson test values have distanced from 2 for all portfolios in 
comparison to CAPM, but still imply very little autocorrelation. The Alpha has turned 
positive for portfolios P25, P15 and P10. Portfolio P5 has a higher Alpha (9,46E-05) 
when compared to CAPM, but the results remain insignificant for all SRI portfolios. The 
Alpha for the unethical portfolio has reduced to 1,83E-04 and is now significant only at 
a 10% -level (1,652). The market beta for P5 has dropped below 1 and the systematic 
market risk has reduced for all other SRI portfolios as well. The SMB –factor is positive 
for SRI portfolios and negative for the unethical portfolio, however the factors are 
significant only for P25 (2,0590) and P10 (1,7730). It was to be expected that SRI-
portfolios tend to behave similarly as small companies and that large companies often 
struggle with SRI issues, which would therefore put them in the unethical category. 
Also the HML –factor reveals expected results SRI-portfolios seem to behave in a 
Annualized 
α
Adj. R²
Durbin-
Watson
3,34E-05 1,0481 *** 0,0367 ** -0,2845 ***
-7,14E-06 1,0220 *** 0,0128 -0,2721 ***
3,55E-05 1,0119 *** 0,0191 -0,3017 ***
6,49E-06 1,0465 *** 0,0424 * -0,2546 ***
9,46E-05 0,9907 *** 0,0305 -0,3159 ***
-4,90E-05 1,0408 *** 0,0017 -0,2613 ***
1,83E-04 * 0,9633 *** -0,0187 0,2200 ***
Alpha α Rm-Rf β SMB β HML β
(0,3709)
(-0,08316)
(0,3887)
(0,0538)
(0,6261)
(-0,4511)
(1,6520)
(108,1000)
BI
UE
0,84 %
-0,18 %
0,90 %
0,16 %
2,38 %
-1,24 %
4,60 %
P25
P20
P15
P10
P5
87,55 %
83,66 %
(-10,8600)
(-10,9000)
(-11,3600)
(-7,2570)
(-7,1970)
(81,0300)
(2,0590)
(0,7525)
(1,0590)
(1,7730)
(1,0200)
(0,0805)
(-0,8571)
(110,7000)
(102,9000)
(80,6200)
(61,0100)
(89,0700)
2,0569
2,0860
1,9346
2,1004
2,0358
2,1915
2,1262
(-8,2730)
(6,8460)
91,25 %
91,61 %
90,51 %
85,18 %
77,12 %
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Annualized α Adj. R² Durbin-Watson
8,99E-05 0,9544 ***
1,12E-04 0,984281 ***
8,07E-05 1,00498 ***
8,15E-05 1,00345 ***
2,17E-05 1,01635 ***
1,61E-04 0,924155 ***
1,36E-04 1,03116 ***
Alpha α Rm-Rf β
(0,7470)
(0,8322)
(0,5088)
(0,4482)
(0,0933)
BI
UE
P25
P20
P15
P10
P5
(0,8565)
(0,4551)
(146,6870)
(135,4067)
(117,3022)
(102,1068)
(80,6887)
(91,1823)
(63,9181)
90,90 % 1,9587
83,08 % 2,0155
2,27 %
2,82 %
2,03 %
2,05 %
0,55 %
4,05 %
3,42 %
1,8573
95,66 % 1,8897
94,30 % 1,9125
96,28 %
92,61 % 1,9148
88,67 % 1,9446
similar fashion as growth stocks, the unethical portfolio as value stocks. In addition al 
results are significant at 1%-significance level. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies. 
 
Table 6. CAPM regression results for period 2.  
 
Period 2 in this study starts from the first turbulences of the financial crisis and extends 
through very volatile times with both bear and bull markets. Table 6 presents the 
CAPM regression results for this period. At first we can note that Alpha is positive for 
each portfolio although the results lack statistical significance. The highest alpha 
(1,61E-04) can be found from the Best Improvement -portfolio (BI), which had the 
worst performance in period 1. The lowest Alpha on the other hand can be found from 
P5, which had the highest Alpha of all SRI-portfolios in period 1. The findings regarding 
the market beta are no longer quite as consistent as in period 1. Portfolios P15, P10, P5 
and UE have a beta greater than 1, whilst portfolios P25, P20 and BI have a beta below 
1. Again all results concerning the market beta are highly significant. Also the 
explanatory power has increase in comparison to the previous period. 
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Table 7. Fama-French 3-factor model regression results for period 2. 
 
Table 7 present the Fama-French 3-factor regression results for period 2. Again we can 
note that the explanatory power or the model has increased for all portfolios except 
UE when compared to CAPM. The Alpha has decreased for every portfolio and P5 has 
now a negative alpha, implying underperformance in respect to the benchmark. 
However direct conclusions cannot be drawn from the results as they are not 
significant at any of the levels set. The market beta is also slightly different. A beta 
greater than 1 can only be observed for portfolios P5 and UE, which also have the 
lowest and highest Alpha coefficients respectively. The SMB –factor in period 2 is 
positive for all portfolios, also the unethical portfolio. The factor loadings are highly 
significant for all SRI portfolios, but insignificant for the unethical portfolio. The HML –
factor, however, presents unexpected results. Portfolios P25, P20, P15 and P10 all 
have positive sensitivities to the HML –factor, which would now put them in the value-
stock category, moreover the factor loadings are highly significant. The Best 
Improvement –portfolio, on the other hand, has a highly significant negative 
coefficient. Also P5 has a negative coefficient, which is significant at a 10% level (-
1,9140). The Unethical portfolio has also a negative sensitivity to the HML –factor 
oppositely to period 1, but the result is not significant (-0,5806). The Durbin-Watson 
test suggest that there is very little autocorrelation between variables in both 
regression from period 2. 
Annualized 
α
Adj. R²
Durbin-
Watson
5,06E-05 0,9330 *** 0,1278 *** 0,0905 ***
6,82E-05 0,9586 *** 0,1407 *** 0,1077 ***
3,88E-05 0,9740 *** 0,1300 *** 0,1271 ***
2,98E-05 0,9852 *** 0,1756 *** 0,0817 ***
-2,50E-05 1,0356 *** 0,1852 *** -0,0610 *
1,06E-04 0,9582 *** 0,2247 *** -0,1148 ***
1,33E-04 1,0377 *** 0,0142 -0,0242
Rm-Rf β SMB β HML βAlpha α
P25
P20
P15
P10
P5
BI
UE
1,28 %
1,72 %
0,98 %
0,75 %
-0,63 %
2,67 %
3,36 %
(0,4446)
(0,5373)
(0,2553)
(7,9530)
(7,8500)
(6,0650)
(6,0870)
(5,7050)
(6,0070)
(125,5000)
(115,6000)
(98,2300)
(85,9900)
(69,3700)
(82,5700)
(53,1700)
96,68 %
96,14 %
94,77 %
(7,0880)
(5,7390)
(8,9550)
(0,3367) (-0,5806)
(-4,6360)
(-1,9140)
(3,3440)(0,1696)
(-0,1092)
(0,5970)
(0,4458)
93,13 %
89,11 %
91,84 %
83,05 %
1,9107
1,9546
1,9725
1,9507
1,9629
1,9204
2,0177
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7.4 Portfolio performance 
The risk-adjusted performance metrics are also important tools, because they allow 
direct comparison between the portfolios. Table 8 shows the results for on all the 
performance measure for both periods. The portfolios are ranked based on their 
scores and the benchmark is included in the results for reference if a measure is 
available. When observing the rankings in period 1, we may note that all metrics place 
the portfolios in the exact same order. The only exception is that the S&P Index is 
ranked 3rd by Sharpe ratio (and Modified Sharpe ratio) and 4th by Treynor ratio. 
Evidently we can draw the conclusion that the Unethical portfolio is the superior 
performer in period 1, while the P5 portfolio is the best SRI portfolio. Jensen’s Alpha 
and the Information ratio place portfolios P10, P20 and BI under the benchmark as 
they score negative values. Due to a different calculation method, Jensen’s Alpha has 
different values than the Alpha coefficient presented in the previous chapter.  
In period 2 all portfolios produced negative returns, which makes interpretation harder 
for Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratio. When the returns are negative a larger 
denominator (indicating higher level of risk) results in a value closer to zero, hence 
expressing better performance. However the bias may not be of significance, if the 
difference between the portfolios is mostly displayed in the numerator (indicating the 
risk-adjusted return). At that, the ranking between the portfolios seems to be rather 
consistent with other performance measures, which would suggest the latter. 
Nevertheless one should be wary of the results.  The problem does not affect Jensen’s 
Alpha and Information ratio as they compare the performance primarily against the 
benchmark. 
First we may note that in period 2 the S&P Index performs much worse than in period 
1. Only portfolio P5 scores slightly lower values than the benchmark. The top 
performer of period 2 is the Best Improvement portfolio, which correspondingly was 
the worst performer in the first period.  Other SRI portfolios performed also 
exceptionally well in period 2, according to Information ratio most of them performed 
even better than the Unethical portfolio. Modified Sharpe ratio rankings are nearly 
identical to Sharpe ratio rankings, which suggests that the sample distribution bias is 
quite insignificant.  
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Table 8. Portfolio rankings according to different performance metrics. 
Period 1 Period 2 
Jensen's Alpha 
Rank Portfolio Value Rank Portfolio Value 
1 UE 0,0050 1 BI 0,0028 
2 P5 0,0012 2 P20 0,0017 
3 P25 0,0001 3 UE 0,0014 
4 P15 0,0000 4 P25 0,0012 
5 P10 -0,0004 5 P15 0,0007 
6 P20 -0,0010 6 P10 0,0007 
7 BI -0,0016 7 P5 -0,0001 
Sharpe ratio 
Rank Portfolio Value Rank Portfolio Value 
1 UE 0,1873 1 BI -0,0100 
2 P5 0,0841 2 P20 -0,0271 
3 S&P 0,0780 3 UE -0,0303 
4 P25 0,0652 4 P25 -0,0319 
5 P15 0,0643 5 P10 -0,0371 
6 P10 0,0536 6 P15 -0,0396 
7 P20 0,0434 7 P5 -0,0445 
8 BI 0,0267 8 S&P -0,0601 
Modified Sharpe ratio 
Rank Portfolio Value Rank Portfolio Value 
1 UE 0,0711 1 BI -0,0039 
2 P5 0,0368 2 P20 -0,0108 
3 S&P 0,0266 3 P25 -0,0125 
4 P25 0,0225 4 UE -0,0125 
5 P15 0,0219 5 P10 -0,0147 
6 P10 0,0187 6 P15 -0,0155 
7 P20 0,0149 7 P5 -0,0167 
8 BI 0,0086 8 S&P -0,0225 
Treynor's ratio 
Rank Portfolio Value Rank Portfolio Value 
1 UE 0,0079 1 BI -0,0008 
2 P5 0,0040 2 P20 -0,0020 
3 P25 0,0028 3 UE -0,0024 
4 S&P 0,0027 4 P25 -0,0024 
5 P15 0,0027 5 P15 -0,0030 
6 P10 0,0024 6 P10 -0,0030 
7 P20 0,0018 7 S&P -0,0037 
8 BI 0,0011 8 P5 -0,0039 
Information ratio 
Rank Portfolio Value Rank Portfolio Value 
1 UE 0,2717 1 BI 0,0983 
2 P5 0,0457 2 P20 0,0818 
3 P25 0,0132 3 P25 0,0689 
4 P15 0,0006 4 P15 0,0304 
5 P10 -0,0109 5 UE 0,0284 
6 P20 -0,0608 6 P10 0,0235 
7 BI -0,0774 7 P5 -0,0063 
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It seems that the overall rankings between the portfolios have been reversed when 
moving from period 1 to period 2. This phenomenon may be due to the fact that the 
portfolios which performed well included more inflated stocks and hence, had the 
highest fall. Then again it may be due to the arbitrary selection of observation periods 
for the study. Be that as it may, the performance metrics do provide important 
information regarding performance comparison between portfolios and economic 
cycles.  
 
Recapping all results on return, risk, regression and performance metrics, we may 
establish a certain consistency in results. All results from period 1 have many 
similarities with findings from previous studies. Results from period 2, however, seem 
to show that market turbulences may induce discrepancies in portfolio attributes. 
Nevertheless some deductions can be drawn from the findings. The result show 
conclusively that in both periods some of the SRI portfolios were able to perform 
better than the market index, some performed worse. The regression statistics show 
however that any over- or underperformance is not statistically significant, which is 
consistent with prior literature (e.g. Hamilton, Jo & Statman 1993; Sauer 1997; Lobe, 
Rothmeier & Walkshäusl 2009). Under the circumstances we may discard hypothesis 
    and confirm hypothesis   : The performance of socially responsible investments 
does not significantly differ from the market performance.  
 
When it comes to the unethical portfolio, the results are again consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Kim & Venkatachalam 2006; Hong & Kacperczyk 2009). Although the 
performance of the portfolio in period 2 was quite meager in comparison to period 1, 
the portfolio was able to beat the market in both periods. Hence hypothesis    can 
certainly be confirmed, the unethical portfolio did outperform the market. 
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7.5 Sensitivity to industries 
The last phase of the study is concentrated on the relationship between the portfolios 
and different industries. First it was imperative to find out which industries excelled in 
social responsibility and which did not. Table 9 shows the social responsibility rankings 
of all 12 industries for both periods. The score implies the Ehical Quote industry score 
for the period (ISP). The observations column shows the number of observed 
companies in each industry at the beginning of the period and at the end of the period. 
 
Table 9. Social responsibility rankings of industries in periods 1 & 2. 
 
Period 1 Period 2 
Rank Industry Score Observations Rank Industry Score Observations 
1 NoDur 5,0 10 - 23 1 Durbl 8,8 3 - 4 
2 Durbl 3,5 3 - 3 2 BusEq 8,6 23 - 23 
3 BusEq 3,4 14 - 23 3 NoDur 7,0 23 - 23 
4 Hlth 2,5 7 - 13 4 Telcm 5,6 10 - 11 
5 Shops 1,2 12 - 28 5 Manuf 4,4 21 - 22 
6 Manuf 1,1 6 - 20 6 Shops 3,8 28 - 29 
7 Finance 1,0 8 - 40 7 Utilities 3,8 15 - 16 
8 Chemicals 0,8 8 - 12 8 Chemicals 2,8 12 - 13 
9 Utilities 0,5 1 - 15 9 Others 2,0 22 - 25 
10 Telcm 0,4 2 - 9 10 Finance 1,1 41 - 44 
11 Others 0,0 5 - 22 11 Hlth 0,5 13 - 13 
12 Energy -1,7 4 - 12 12 Energy -1,5 12 - 13 
 
The abbreviations are derived from Kenneth French’s data library. NoDur refers to 
consumer non durables, Durbl to consumer durables, Manuf to manufacturing, BusEq 
to business equipments, Telcm to telecommunications and Hlth to healthcare. For 
more detailed information regarding industry specifications and sic-codes, see 
appendix 3. 
 
Unexpectedly consumer non durables take the lead in period 1 although they include 
companies involved in tobacco and alcohol production. It seems that this broad 
specification also holds sub-industries, which neutralize the negative effects of the 
unethical ones. We may also note that the number of observations varies a lot 
between industries. Since Covalence selects the observed companies based on their 
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market capitalization, it s only natural that some industries have a more significant 
presence.  For instance consumer durables and telecommunications have very few 
observations whereas finance covers nearly one fifth of all observations. If we compare 
the scores between the two periods we can note that healthcare takes a sudden drop 
in period, while telecommunications rises towards the top. Other industries more or 
less hold their position. In the second period the average scores grow relatively from 
period 1. It is possible that along the observation periods Covalence has modified their 
data collection methods or simply that the number of sources has grown. Evidently the 
energy industry is the only one to score negative values for both periods. This 
observation of course implies that the energy industry has neglected social 
responsibility issues and hence been subjected to negative media exposure. However 
the observation also points out that a vast majority of news items regarding social 
responsibility are interpreted as positive. In fact the mean score is 1,5 in period 1 and 
3,9 in period 2. 
 
After calculating the industry scores the next step was to see how industry portfolios 
with similar specifications would correlate with the SRI portfolios. Tables 10 and 11 
present the correlation coefficients between all portfolios and 12 industry portfolios. 
The highest and lowest correlations for the SRI portfolios are cropped with borders. 
The correlation coefficients were also subjected to a t-test and since all results were 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% -levels respectively, they are not presented in the tables.  
 
As expected the energy industry bares the lowest correlation with all SRI portfolios, 
but interestingly also with the market portfolio. All SRI portfolios have also the highest 
correlation with the same industry, which is business equipments. Other industries 
with high correlation are others, manufacturing, finance, consumer durables and 
telecommunications. The general lineup between industry scores (table 9) and 
correlations is quite similar although not exact, especially telecommunications and 
others deviate from the order. There are a number of reasons which can explain this 
diversion. As mentioned the difference in the number of observations between 
industries might most certainly skew the results. Secondly the industry portfolios are 
derived from the whole US market so it probably differs from our sample in terms of 
composition and especially company size. In addition “others” includes miscellaneous 
companies that are not compliant with any of the specified industries and therefore its 
composition may be completely different from the sample. We may also observe that 
the correlations decrease in a linear fashion as the screening stringency becomes 
stronger. Unexpectedly the order in how well the industries correlate with the 
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unethical portfolio is not reversed in comparison to SRI portfolios.  The sensitivities, in 
fact, are quite close to each other. Only the correlation with business equipments is 
notably lower. 
 
Table 10. Correlation matrix between the portfolios and industries in period 1. 
 
  S&P BP25 BP20 BP15 BP10 BP5 BPbi BPue 
NoDur 79,6 % 69,9 % 71,2 % 72,0 % 69,5 % 67,6 % 70,2 % 80,7 % 
Durbl 84,1 % 82,5 % 82,7 % 82,8 % 82,4 % 76,1 % 82,2 % 77,3 % 
Manuf 91,3 % 86,4 % 86,5 % 86,0 % 84,0 % 80,2 % 84,7 % 86,1 % 
Energy 64,0 % 53,7 % 53,3 % 52,4 % 50,4 % 49,0 % 52,3 % 72,4 % 
Chemicals 82,8 % 74,9 % 76,2 % 77,1 % 75,0 % 73,6 % 75,6 % 80,5 % 
BusEq 87,7 % 93,0 % 92,4 % 91,4 % 88,8 % 82,4 % 88,9 % 72,6 % 
Telcm 85,0 % 84,0 % 83,1 % 81,1 % 78,8 % 74,1 % 80,1 % 75,4 % 
Utilities 68,2 % 60,0 % 60,5 % 59,4 % 59,4 % 56,8 % 60,2 % 63,1 % 
Shops 87,2 % 81,5 % 81,6 % 81,3 % 78,4 % 73,1 % 79,8 % 82,1 % 
Hlth 83,3 % 78,2 % 79,6 % 80,4 % 79,2 % 79,0 % 80,0 % 72,7 % 
Finance 93,5 % 85,8 % 85,9 % 85,0 % 82,2 % 77,2 % 83,9 % 84,8 % 
Others 93,6 % 89,5 % 89,6 % 88,4 % 86,1 % 81,4 % 87,3 % 84,8 % 
The first important observation in regard to the previous period is that the overall 
correlation coefficients are significantly higher. This may be due to a larger number of 
observations, but also due to the exceptional market conditions of period 2. However 
it seems that the sensitivities have not changed drastically. The order is not as 
conclusive as in period 2 and there is more dispersion between portfolios. 
Nevertheless business equipments still take the lead together with manufacturing, 
consumer durables and others. Finance, which suffered a major drop in social 
responsibility scores, is no longer at the top. Considering that the stock market crash 
was primarily induced by the financial sector, this is not surprising. This might also 
explain why the finance industry correlates relatively poorly with the unethical 
portfolio. Oddly enough, healthcare industry which took a dive in social responsibility 
scores has the lowest correlation with the unethical portfolio. The energy industry, 
together with utilities, has still the lowest correlation with SRI portfolios. Although 
there are some discrepancies between the social responsibility scores and correlations 
the evidence seems to point out that industries which have poor ethical scores have 
also a lower correlation with SRI portfolios. Hence, we may confirm hypothesis  . 
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Table 11. Correlation matrix between the portfolios and industries in period 2. 
 
  S&P BP25 BP20 BP15 BP10 BP5 BPbi BPue 
NoDur 91,1 % 90,1 % 89,4 % 88,3 % 87,3 % 84,7 % 89,2 % 83,3 % 
Durbl 90,5 % 93,1 % 93,3 % 93,2 % 93,6 % 92,8 % 93,1 % 83,4 % 
Manuf 95,5 % 94,4 % 93,8 % 93,0 % 93,1 % 93,0 % 92,9 % 90,7 % 
Energy 86,2 % 78,8 % 77,9 % 76,7 % 76,6 % 78,1 % 76,3 % 87,4 % 
Chemicals 93,2 % 91,1 % 90,3 % 89,2 % 89,0 % 88,6 % 89,1 % 87,3 % 
BusEq 94,3 % 93,6 % 93,6 % 93,2 % 94,0 % 94,4 % 94,4 % 85,5 % 
Telcm 93,3 % 92,2 % 91,7 % 90,9 % 90,6 % 88,6 % 90,7 % 84,1 % 
Utilities 85,8 % 81,8 % 80,4 % 78,8 % 78,0 % 77,3 % 78,9 % 81,2 % 
Shops 90,9 % 92,7 % 92,6 % 92,1 % 91,4 % 87,1 % 92,2 % 80,2 % 
Hlth 87,9 % 85,3 % 84,6 % 83,0 % 81,7 % 78,2 % 81,7 % 77,7 % 
Finance 90,1 % 90,5 % 90,7 % 90,5 % 88,3 % 83,6 % 84,6 % 79,0 % 
Others 94,1 % 93,9 % 93,9 % 93,5 % 93,5 % 92,3 % 92,1 % 87,8 % 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
For several years socially responsible investing has been a growing trend in the United 
States and against all expectations it has continued to grow during the latest economic 
downturn. The phenomenon has been widely investigated from the mid 90’s onwards 
from a variety of perspectives. Although there have been some contradictory results, 
the general outline of the findings do have a certain consistency. Consequently this 
evidence has cumulated over the years and has set standards on expectations when it 
comes to new studies. Empirical evidence suggests that socially responsible investing 
does not differ from conventional investing, which might explain why investors are so 
keen on taking it into account. Nonetheless certain aspects of the phenomenon have 
been neglected and this study attempts to fill some of the gaps in the empirical 
evidence. The purpose of this study is to investigate the performance of socially 
responsible portfolios in the context of the modern portfolio theory, which per se is 
not out of the ordinary. The fresh approach comes from the applied methodologies 
and limitations. First of all prior studies have concentrated on professionally managed 
portfolios and indices, in this study the portfolios are constructed on purely ethical 
grounds. The performance of the portfolios is investigated through common methods, 
but the emphasis is on screening stringency and the differences between two 
distinctive periods which display different economic climates. The effect of industries 
has also been an ignored factor in prior literature. Therefore the social responsibility of 
a specific sector and its correlation to SRI portfolios is also investigated. 
 
The empirical results are twofold. To some extent the findings are consistent with 
previous studies, however there are also indications that the financial crisis might have 
disrupted the expected behavior of SRI portfolios. The study also provides new 
information regarding social screening and the effects of industries. Risk and return are 
the first elements to provide performance related evidence. The findings regarding the 
cumulative returns reveal the ex-post yield of each portfolio. More importantly we 
may note that there seems to be consistency in how the SRI portfolios behave in 
different parts of the market cycle. Figures 5 and 6 show that all SRI portfolios have 
strong reactions to clear upward- and downward trends but their returns lag in 
steadier times.  This is a finding that would deserve a more thorough research.  
The risk is measured by volatility and tracking error and the emphasis in particular is in 
the screening stringency. We can observe that the risk profiles of the portfolios did 
shift in the downturn. A curvilinear relationship between total risk and screening 
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stringency can be spotted in period 1 but no longer in period 2. The tracking error, 
however, does display a growing curve for both periods. In accordance with Kurtz’s 
(2005) assumptions it does indeed grow as the screening gets more stringent. 
Evidently the volatility is also higher for the portfolios with the most stringent screens. 
These findings imply that a diminishing universe of available investing opportunities 
does have a negative effect on the portfolio risk. In this study, however, the results 
may have been biased by a relatively small number of observations and therefore 
direct conclusions cannot be made. The effect of screening stringency on tracking error 
should be studied further from the perspective of SRI funds or other socially 
responsible and actively managed portfolios in order to attain more conclusive results. 
 
The regression analysis expectedly produced more decisive results. The analysis was 
performed for capital asset pricing model and Fama-French 3-factor model derived OLS 
regressions. The regression statistics reveal that the explanatory power (Adjusted R²) 
of each model is at a reasonable level and Durbin-Watson test did not detect any 
significant autocorrelation in residuals. None of the SRI portfolios outperformed nor 
underperformed the market at any significance level. In reference to prior empirical 
evidence this was an expected result. However the unethical portfolio was able to beat 
the market in the first period at a 5% significance level in CAPM regression and at a 
10% level in Fama-French 3-factor model regression. Although the performance was 
remarkable in the first period, the unethical portfolio could not produce significant 
outperformance in period 2. This is another interesting discovery since prior studies 
indicate that unethical investments should perform especially well in hard times.  
 
The beta for SRI portfolios is systematically higher in the first period, however in period 
2 the beta falls under 1 for most SRI portfolios. Conversely the unethical portfolio, 
which has a beta under 1 in period 1, has an increased level of systematic risk in the 
second period. Again the results for period 1 are highly consistent with previous 
studies, but not for period 2. A similar oddity is discovered from the 3-factor model, 
the SMB and HML –factors display curious results. Normally SRI portfolios have had a 
positive sensitivity to the SMB factor and a negative sensitivity to the HML factor. For 
unethical portfolios the correlations have been opposite. The results meet these 
expectations in period 1, but strikingly the HML -factor delivers completely different 
results in the second period. The correlation becomes positive for most SRI portfolios 
and the unethical portfolio delivers insignificant results. The composition of the 
portfolios did not drastically change between the periods, so it cannot explain this 
phenomenon. The factors simply show how well the studied portfolios mimic SMB and 
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HML portfolios. It would therefore be reasonable to dig deeper and investigate how 
much the market capitalizations and Book-to-market ratios have altered.  
 
The risk-adjusted performance metrics do deliver some final closure. Each measure 
conclusively shows that the unethical portfolio was undoubtedly the best performer in 
period 1. Moreover all metrics place the SRI portfolios in the same order. The second 
period results are a tad more scattered but the metrics share a coherent trend in the 
rankings. It seems that the portfolios which performed worse in the first period were 
the better performers of the second period. The unethical portfolio and at least some 
of the SRI portfolios performed better then market in both periods. 
 
When studying the effect of the industries there is no clear point of reference due to 
the lack of prior research. The social responsibility rankings correspond to what could 
have been expected considering the background and strategies of socially responsible 
investing. The fairly low number of observations limited the study to quite broad 
sector specifications and therefore the traditional “sin-industries” are incorporated 
into other sectors. The correlations between industries and SRI portfolios did not 
match exactly with the social responsibility rankings, but the general outline was 
similar. The correlation coefficients however do provide an important piece of 
information. The industries which lack social responsibility tend to also have a lower 
correlation with SRI portfolios. This implies that SRI portfolios could be used as means 
of diversification for portfolios which have a strong focus in these sectors. The 
unethical portfolio did not seem to have similar attributes. 
 
Consistent with the majority of prior research, this study confirms that socially 
responsible investing does not significantly differ from conventional investing. The 
screening stringency would require more study, but the evidence does point out that 
there is a limit after which the portfolio risk starts to grow gradually. The study 
however does leave some open questions. For instance the reason why the risk 
profiles of the portfolios altered when moving from an economic cycle to another is 
unclear. It is possible that the selected observation periods did not reflect different 
cycles effectively, for both periods did include downward and upward trends. It would 
be interesting to study the sensitivities of SRI portfolios on different parts of the 
economic cycle. Further research could also be targeted in investigating the financial 
performance of companies with reputable SRI standards.   
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As a final remark the empirical evidence from the study indicates that socially 
responsible investing should not lead to a direct performance penalty. Therefore 
investors may utilize SRI rankings as part of their overall decision making process. The 
evidence however suggests that investors should avoid investment vehicles that apply 
a too stringent screening process. It is naturally left for the investor to judge whether a 
ranking or a set of screens is in line with his or hers personal values. However, there 
are no signs that the trend of socially responsible investing would ware off. Thus, 
investors will probably have enough relevant information and options to be able to fit 
their own financial ambitions to individual ethical spectrums. 
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A. Working conditions
Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights 
1948
OECD Guidelines 
for 
Multinational 
Enterprises 1976
ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of 
Principles 
concerning 
Multinational 
Enterprises and 
Social Policy 
1977
Rio Declaration 
on Environment 
and 
Development 
1992
Copenhagen 
Agreements on 
Social 
Development 
1995
United Nations 
Global Compact 
2000
UN Millenium 
Declaration & 
Millenium Goals 
2000
1. Labour 
standards
Criteria 1. Labour standards covers labour issues 
taking place within the company. It is inspired by 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, dealing with freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining; the elimination of 
all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the 
effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.
Articles 4, 6, 20, 
23.1, 23.3, 23.4, 24
II. General policies 1-
5 ; IV Employment 
and Industrial 
Relations 1-5
Paragraphs 8, 21, 36 Declaration 8 Principles 3, 4, 5, 6
Millenium Goals No. 
8
2. Wages
Criteria 2. Wages looks at how the company 
manages the level of wages paid to employees 
and executives.
Articles 23. 1., 23.2 II. General policies 1 Paragraphs 3, 34 Principle 3. Principles 3, 4, 5, 6
Millenium 
Declaration I.5 
Millenium Goals No. 
1
3. Social 
benefits
Criteria 3. Social Benefits looks at measures 
taken internally or externally by the company 
regarding social benefits and advantages for 
employees and families.
Article 23.3 II. General policies 1
Millenium 
Declaration III.19
4. Training and 
insertion
Criteria 4. Training and insertion looks at how 
the company takes measures regarding training 
employees, continued formation, stabilisation of 
jobs and social plans in case of lay-offs.
Article 26
II. General policies 1, 
4
Paragraphs 24, 26, 
30, 31
Programme of action 
8
Millenium Goals No. 
2
APPENDIX 1. Covalence Criteria of Business Contribution to Human Development
5. Women
Criteria 5. Women describes working conditions 
for women and the coordination of professional 
and private life.
Article 23.1, 23.2 II. General policies 1 Paragraph 21 Principle 2. Declaration 7
Millenium 
Declaration I.6, 
Millenium 
Declaration III.13, 
Millenium Goals No. 
3
6. External 
working 
conditions
Criteria 6. External working conditions, covers 
working conditions outside the analyzed 
company. It pertains to the working conditions of 
its suppliers, subcontracters and other 
professional partners, and the measures the 
company has taken to improve upon them.
Articles 4, 6, 20, 
23.1, 23.3, 23.4, 24
I. Principles 2,4 ; II 
General Policies 1, 4, 
5, 10 ; IV 
Employment and 
Industrial Relations 1-
5
Paragraphs 8, 21, 36 Principle 3. Declaration 8 Principles 3, 4, 5, 6
Millenium Goals No. 
8
B. Impact of production
7. Sales
Criteria 7. Sales describes where a company sells 
its products / services and how these sales 
benefit people and the environment.
II. General policies 1
8. Link with 
official 
development 
aid
Criteria 8. Link with official development aid 
highlights when a company collaborates with, or 
benefits from, a governmental development aid 
program.
Programme of action 
11 (h)
Millenium 
Declaration I.6
9. Export risk 
guarantee
Criteria 9. Export risk guarantee describes a 
situation when a government covers the risks 
taken by a national company investing abroad
Millenium Goals No. 
8
10. 
International 
presence
Criteria 10. International presence describes the 
impact of the company's foreign direct 
investments and related policies. More broadly, 
it deals with how the international presence of a 
company is perceived. When details are lacking, 
criteria 10 is used to express a general feeling, 
positive or negative, about a company's 
presence in foreign countries.
II. General policies 1, 
3
Paragraphs 1, 10
Programme of action 
9
Principles 3, 4, 5, 6
11. Joint 
ventures
Criteria 11. Joint ventures receives information 
about multinational companies investing 
together with other companies to create a new 
company and the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of such joint ventures.
II. General policies 1, 
3, 5
Paragraph 1
Programme of action 
8, 12
Millenium 
Declaration III.20, 
Millenium Goals No. 
8
12. Economic 
impact
Criteria 12. Economic impact of production deals 
with how a company's investments influence 
local industries in terms of job creation, access to 
markets, competition, economic growth.
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
3 ; IX. Competition 1
Paragraph 1, 40 Principle 3. Declaration 7, 9 Principle 1
Millenium 
Declaration III.11, 
Millenium Goals No. 
1
13. Social 
impact
Criteria 13. Social impact receives information on 
how the company's operations influence the 
implementation of local laws relating to social 
areas c.f. social protection, public health, 
employee relations or fiscal relations.
Articles 7, 22
II. General policies 1, 
3
Principle 3.
Declaration 9, PA 8, 
12 (i)
Declaration 9. 
Programme of 
Action 12 (i)
14. Job stability
Criteria 14. Job stability looks at the turn-over of 
the company's employees n the different 
countries / regions where it is active.
II. General policies 1, 
4
Paragraphs 13, 14
Programme of 
Action. 8.
15. Local 
employees
Criteria 15. Local employees looks at the number 
and the proportion of local employees in the 
company in the different countries / regions 
where it is active.
Article 23.1
II. General policies 1, 
4
Paragraph 18
Millenium Goals No. 
8
16. Local 
executives
Criteria 16. Local executives looks at the number 
and the proportion of local executives in the 
company in the different countries / regions 
where it is active.
Article 23.1
II. General policies 1, 
4
Paragraph 18
Millenium Goals No. 
8
17. Women 
employed
Criteria 17. Women employed looks at the 
proportion of women among the company's 
employees and among the company's 
executives.
Articles 23. 1., 23.2
II. General policies 1, 
4
Paragraph 21 Declaration 7
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
18. Downsizing
Criteria 18. Downsizing is used to code 
information that relates to factory closures, the 
transfer of production to another country, and 
measures taken to minimize negative social 
effects of such decisions.
II. General policies 1, 
4 ; IV. Employment 
and Industrial 
Relations. 6
Paragraphs 24, 26
Millenium Goals No. 
3
19. Infra-
structures
Criteria 19. Infrastructures describes when a 
company is (co-) financing public infrastructures 
in a country where it is investing.
Article 22
II. General policies 1, 
3
20. Local 
sourcing
Criteria 20. Local sourcing highlights when a 
company is buying / sourcing directly to a local 
producer, farmer.
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
3
Paragraph 20
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
21. Stability of 
prices
Criteria 21. Stability of prices describes how a 
company manages prices of raw materials on 
international commodity markets (not direct 
sourcing).
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
3
Programme of action 
11
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
22. Technical 
assistance
Criteria 22. Technical assistance highlights when 
a company transmits skills, knowledge, 
technologies to another company / partner.
Articles 22, 25, 26
II. General policies 1, 
3 ; VIII. Science and 
Technology 2, 3
Paragraph 19
Programme of action 
8, 9, 12
Millenium Goals No. 
8
23. Intellectual 
propriety rights
Criteria 23. Intellectual property rights describes 
how a company manages its own intellectual 
propriety rights vis-à-vis other companies and 
countries. Has the company taken measures that 
promote human and economic development, 
the protection of biodiversity, respect of 
traditional knowledge and local natural 
resources, for example through research & 
development, voluntary licenses, agreements, 
cooperation with research institutes and local 
communities?
Articles 17, 25, 27.2
II. General policies 1, 
3 ; VIII. Science and 
Technology 2, 4
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
24. Local 
innovation
Criteria 24. Local innovation highlights when a 
company helps another company to develop a 
new product
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
3 ; VIII. Science and 
Technology 3, 5
Millenium Goals No. 
8
25. Fiscal 
contributions
Criteria 25. Fiscal contributions looks at the 
following questions: Does the company pay 
taxes ? Where ? How much? What can the 
company say about its fiscal relations policy ? 
How can the company assess the impact of its 
fiscal contributions to local economic and social 
development ?
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
3, 5 ; X. Taxation.
Programme of action 
9
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
26. Environ-
mental impact
Criteria 26. Environmental impact of production 
is used to categorize information that relates to 
how a company's production activities are 
impacting the environment, nature, animals and 
biodiversity.
II. General policies 1, 
5 ; V. Environment.
Principle 4, 10. Declaration 6 Principle 8
Millenium Goals No. 
7
C. Impact of product
27. Product 
human risk
Criteria 27. Product human risk describes when a 
product or service is perceived to be risky to man 
or nature and when a company reduces such 
risks.
Articles 3, 25
II. General policies 1, 
5 ; VII. Consumer 
Interests.
28. Product 
social utility
Criteria 28. Product Social Utility serves to 
describe when a company offers, or is being 
asked to provide, products or services that 
respond to needs related to human, social and 
economic development.
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1 
; VII. Consumer 
Interests ; VIII. 
Science and 
Technology
Declaration 9
29. Product 
relation to 
culture
Criteria 29. Product relation to culture describes 
the relation between a product and a culture: 
how a product valuates culture and traditions?
Articles 22, 26, 27
II. General policies 1 
; VII. Consumer 
Interests.
Principle 22.
Programme of action 
8
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
30. Socially 
innovative 
product
Criteria 30. Socially innovative product reflect 
communications regarding the research & 
development (R&D) of products or services that 
present a particular interest for responding to 
human needs and contributing to economic and 
social development.
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1 
; VII. Consumer 
Interests ; VIII. 
Science and 
Technology
31. Product 
environmental 
risk
Criteria 31. Product Environmental Risk reflects 
communications found about a product or 
service described to be risky to nature, animals, 
the environment and biodiversity by itself or by 
its implications. It also reflects measures taken 
by companies to minimize such risks.
Article 3
II. General policies 1, 
5 ; V. Environment; 
VII. Consumer 
Interests ; VIII. 
Science and 
Technology
Principle 4, 10. Declaration 9 Principle 7
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
32. Waste 
management
Criteria 32. Waste management describes action 
/ lack of action in waste management. Has the 
company taken particular measures relatively to 
the management of waste due to its products 
and production?
II. General policies 1, 
5 ; V. Environment.
Principle 4, 10.
Programme of action 
8
Millenium 
Declaration I.5, 
Millenium Goals No. 
7
33. Eco-
innovative 
product
Criteria 33. Eco-innovative product covers 
information regarding new products or services 
offered by the company that are friendly to 
nature, animals, the environment and 
biodiversity.
II. General policies 1, 
5 ; V. Environment
Principle 4, 10.
Declaration 6, 
Programme of action 
8
Principle 9
Millenium Goals No. 
7
34. 
Information to 
consumer
Criteria 34. Information to consumer looks at 
how companies are, or aren't, providing the 
public and consumers with information 
regarding product or services, the impact of 
production, working conditions or institutional 
impact.
Articles 3, 25
II. General policies 1 
; VII. Consumer 
Interests.
Declaration 9
Millenium 
Declaration V.25
35. Pricing / 
needs
Criteria 35. Pricing / needs looks at which price 
does a company sell its products considering 
their social utility and capacity to respond to 
essential human needs.
Articles 3, 25
II. General policies 1 
; IX. Competition.
Principle 5, 6.
Millenium 
Declaration I.5, 
Millenium Goals No. 
1
36. Cause 
related 
marketing
Criteria 36. Cause related marketing highlights 
when the support to social / environmental 
projects is linked to the selling of a product
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
D. Institutional impact
37. Social 
sponsorship
Criteria 37. Social sponsorship pertains to 
information about a company's donation of 
money or goods to an external organization in 
the pursuit of social or environmental objectives.
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
38. Anti-
corruption 
policy
Criteria 38. Anti-corruption policy covers 
material presenting how companies are acting, 
or failing to act, against corruption.
Articles 22, 25
II. General policies 1, 
2, 5 ; VI. Combating 
Bribery.
Declaration 4, 
rogramme of action 
11, 13
Principle 10
Millenium 
Declaration II.9, 
Millenium Goals No. 
8
39. 
Humanitarian 
policy
Criteria 39. Humanitarian policy describes how a 
company behaves in and about emergency 
situations such as wars, civil wars and natural 
disasters.
Articles 3, 28
II. General policies 1, 
2.
Principle 23, 24, 25. Declaration 5
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
40. Human 
rights policy
Criteria 40. Human Rights Policy is used to code 
information that pertains to how a company 
deals, or should deal, with the respect for, and 
promotion of human rights, internally and 
externally. In addition, it is used to code 
information that relates to how the company 
deals, or should deal, with governments and 
their individual human rights policy.
Articles 3, 5, 9, 19
II. General policies 1, 
2.
Principle 23. Principles 1, 2
Millenium 
Declaration I.2
41. Relations 
with United 
Nations
Criteria 41. Relations with United Nations 
describes how a company discusses and 
collaborates with programmes or agencies of the 
United Nations, or UN-supported projects, such 
as the Global Compact, UNEP, UNDP, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, etc.
Principles 1-9
Millenium 
Declaration I.3
42. Boycott 
policy
Criteria 42. Boycott Policy describes how a 
company deals with calls to boycott certain 
countries and governments because of the 
human rights situation
II. General policies 1, 
2
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
43. Social 
stability
Criteria 43. Social stability describes when a 
company helps, or fails to help, promote local 
social stability in a community where it is active. 
A company may do this by offering training, 
subsidies, or by engaging in some other means 
of direct involvement in matters related to 
education, health, the environment, security.
Articles 25, 26
Programme of action 
8
Millenium 
Declaration I.4
44. Support to 
political actors
Criteria 44. Support to Politicians compiles 
information describing relations of a company 
with political actors, such as financial support.
II. General policies 1, 
5, 6, 11
Millenium 
Declaration I.5
45. Lobbying 
practices
Criteria 45. Lobbying Practices covers material 
describing lobbying activities of companies: 
activities aiming at influencing decisions taken by 
governments at the national and international 
levels.
Article 30
II. General policies 1, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11
Principle 27. Principle 1
Millenium 
Declaration III.13
Company Primary SIC-code Industry Stock Market
3M Co. 3841 Healthcare NYSE
Abbott Laboratories 2834 Healthcare NYSE
ACE Limited 6331 Finance NYSE
Aetna Inc. 6324 Finance NYSE
AFLAC Inc. 6321 Finance NYSE
Air Products & Chemicals Inc. 2810 Chemicals NYSE
Alcoa Inc. 3350 Manufacturing NYSE
Allstate Corp. 6331 Finance NYSE
Altria Group Inc. 2111 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
American Electric Power Co. Inc. 4911 Utilities NYSE
American Express Company 6199 Finance NYSE
American International Group Inc. 6331 Finance NYSE
Ameriprise Financial Inc. 6282 Finance NYSE
Amgen Inc. 2836 Healthcare NASDAQ
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. 1311 Energy NYSE
Analog Devices Inc. 3621 Manufacturing NYSE
Apache Corp. 1311 Energy NYSE
Apple Inc. 3571 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Applied Materials Inc. 3674 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Archer Daniels Midland Company 2070 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
AT&T Inc. 4813 Telephone NYSE
Automatic Data Processing Inc. 7374 Business Equipment NYSE
Avery Dennison Corporation 2670 Manufacturing NYSE
Avon Products Inc. 2844 Chemicals NYSE
Baker Hughes Incorporated 3533 Manufacturing NYSE
Bank of America Corporation 6021 Finance NYSE
Baxter International Inc. 3841 Healthcare NYSE
Becton Dickinson and Company 3841 Healthcare NYSE
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. 5700 Shops NYSE
Best Buy Co. Inc. 5731 Shops NYSE
Boeing Co. 3721 Manufacturing NYSE
Boston Scientific Corporation 3841 Healthcare NYSE
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 2834 Healthcare NYSE
Bunge Ltd. 2070 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Cablevision Systems Corporation 4841 Telephone NYSE
Campbell Soup Co. 2000 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Capital One Financial Corp. 6022 Finance NYSE
Cardinal Health Inc. 5122 Shops NYSE
Carnival Corp. 4400 Other NYSE
Caterpillar Inc. 3531 Manufacturing NYSE
Charles Schwab Corp. 6211 Finance NASDAQ
Chevron Corp. 2911 Energy NYSE
CIGNA Corp. 6324 Finance NYSE
Cisco Systems Inc. 3674 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Citigroup Inc. 6021 Finance NYSE
Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. 7371 Business Equipment NYSE
APPENDIX 2. List of US Companies Monitored by Covalence
Clorox Corporation 2842 Chemicals NYSE
CME Group Inc. 6200 Finance NASDAQ
Coach Inc. 3100 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. 2080 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Colgate-Palmolive Co. 2844 Chemicals NYSE
Comcast Corporation 4841 Telephone NASDAQ
ConAgra Foods Inc. 2000 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
ConocoPhillips 2911 Energy NYSE
Constellation Energy Group Inc. 4911 Utilities NYSE
Corning Inc. 3357 Manufacturing NYSE
Costco Wholesale Corporation 5331 Shops NASDAQ
CVS Caremark Corporation 5912 Shops NYSE
Darden Restaurants Inc. 5812 Shops NYSE
Deere & Co. 3523 Manufacturing NYSE
Dell Inc. 3571 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Devon Energy Corporation 1311 Energy NYSE
DIRECTV Group Inc. 4899 Telephone NASDAQ
Dish Network Corp. 4841 Telephone NASDAQ
Dominion Resources Inc. 4911 Utilities NYSE
DR Horton Inc. 1531 Other NYSE
Duke Energy Corporation 4931 Utilities NYSE
E.ON AG 4911 Utilities NYSE
eBay Inc. 7389 Other NYSE
EchoStar Corp. 3663 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Ecolab Inc. 2840 Chemicals NASDAQ
Edison International 4911 Utilities NYSE
EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. 2820 Chemicals NYSE
Electronic Arts Inc. 7372 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Eli Lilly & Co. 2843 Chemicals NYSE
EMC Corporation 3572 Business Equipment NYSE
Emerson Electric Co. 3600 Manufacturing NYSE
Entergy Corporation 4911 Utilities NYSE
Equity Residential 6798 Finance NYSE
Exelon Corp. 4931 Utilities NYSE
Exxon Mobil Corp. 2911 Energy NYSE
Fannie Mae 6798 Finance NYSE
FedEx Corporation 4513 Other NYSE
Fifth Third Bancorp 6022 Finance NASDAQ
FirstEnergy Corp. 4911 Utilities NYSE
Fluor Corporation 1600 Other NYSE
Ford Motor Co. 3711 Consumer Durables NYSE
Fortune Brands Inc. 3430 Manufacturing NYSE
Foster Wheeler AG 1600 Other NASDAQ
FPL Group Inc. 4911 Utilities NYSE
Franklin Resources Inc. 6282 Finance NYSE
Freddie Mac 6798 Finance NYSE
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 1000 Other NYSE
Gannett Co. Inc. 2711 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Gap Inc. 5651 Shops NYSE
General Dynamics Corp. 3730 Manufacturing NYSE
General Electric Co. 6141 Finance NYSE
General Mills Inc. 2040 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
General Motors 3711 Consumer Durables NYSE
Genuine Parts Co. 5013 Shops NYSE
Gilead Sciences Inc. 2836 Healthcare NASDAQ
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 6211 Finance NYSE
Google Inc. 7370 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Halliburton Company 1389 Energy NYSE
Harley-Davidson Inc. 3751 Consumer Durables NYSE
Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. 6331 Finance NYSE
Hershey Co. 2060 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Hess Corporation 2911 Energy NYSE
Hewlett-Packard Company 3570 Business Equipment NYSE
HJ Heinz Co. 2030 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Honeywell International Inc. 3741 Manufacturing NYSE
Illinois Tool Works Inc. 3560 Manufacturing NYSE
Intel Corporation 3674 Business Equipment NASDAQ
International Business Machines Corp. 3570 Business Equipment NYSE
International Game Technology 3990 Consumer Durables NYSE
International Paper Co. 2621 Manufacturing NYSE
Invesco Ltd. 6282 Finance NYSE
J. C. Penney Company Inc. 5311 Shops NYSE
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. 1600 Other NYSE
Johnson & Johnson 2834 Healthcare NYSE
Johnson Controls Inc. 2531 Manufacturing NYSE
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 6021 Finance NYSE
Kellogg Company 2040 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Kimberly-Clark Corporation 2670 Manufacturing NYSE
Kohl s Corp. 5311 Shops NYSE
Kraft Foods Inc. 2000 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Kroger Co. 5411 Shops NYSE
Las Vegas Sands Corp. 7011 Other NYSE
Liberty Media Capital 4841 Telephone NASDAQ
Limited Brands Inc. 5632 Shops NYSE
Lincoln National Corp. 6311 Finance NYSE
Lockheed Martin Corporation 3760 Manufacturing NYSE
Loews Corporation 6331 Finance NYSE
Lorillard Inc. 2111 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Lowe s Companies Inc. 5211 Shops NYSE
Macy s Inc. 5311 Shops NYSE
Marathon Oil Corporation 2911 Energy NYSE
Marriott International Inc. 6798 Finance NYSE
Marsh & McLennan Companies Inc. 6411 Finance NYSE
Masco Corporation 2430 Other NYSE
MasterCard Inc. 7389 Other NYSE
Mattel Inc. 3942 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
McDermott International Inc. 3443 Manufacturing NYSE
McDonald s Corp. 5812 Shops NYSE
McKesson Corporation 5122 Shops NYSE
MedcoHealth Solutions Inc. 5912 Shops NYSE
Medtronic Inc. 3845 Healthcare NYSE
Merck & Co. Inc. 2834 Healthcare NYSE
MetLife Inc. 6311 Finance NYSE
Microsoft Corporation 7372 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Monsanto Co. 2870 Chemicals NYSE
Morgan Stanley 6211 Finance NYSE
Mosaic Co. 2870 Chemicals NYSE
Motorola Inc. 3663 Business Equipment NYSE
Newmont Mining Corp. 1040 Other NYSE
News Corp. 2711 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Nike Inc. 3021 Manufacturing NYSE
Northrop Grumman Corporation 3812 Business Equipment NYSE
Nucor Corporation 3312 Manufacturing NYSE
NYSE Euronext Inc. 6200 Finance NYSE
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 1311 Energy NYSE
Omnicom Group Inc. 7311 Other NYSE
Oracle Corp. 7372 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Peabody Energy Corp. 1221 Energy NYSE
Pepsico Inc. 2080 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Pfizer Inc. 2834 Healthcare NYSE
PG & E Corp. 4931 Utilities NYSE
Philip Morris International Inc. 2111 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
PPG Industries Inc. 2851 Chemicals NYSE
PPL Corporation 4911 Utilities NYSE
Praxair Inc. 2810 Chemicals NYSE
Procter & Gamble Co. 2840 Chemicals NYSE
Progressive Corp. 6331 Finance NYSE
Prudential Financial Inc. 6311 Finance NYSE
Public Service Enterprise Group Inc. 4931 Utilities NYSE
QUALCOMM Inc. 3663 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Qwest Communications International Inc. 4813 Telephone NYSE
Raytheon Co. 3812 Business Equipment NYSE
Reynolds American Inc. 2111 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. 4400 Other NYSE
Safeway Inc. 5411 Shops NYSE
Sara Lee Corp. 2000 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Schlumberger AG 1389 Energy NYSE
Sears Holdings Corporation 5311 Shops NASDAQ
Sempra Energy 4932 Utilities NYSE
Sherwin-Williams Co. 5200 Shops NYSE
Simon Property Group Inc. 6798 Finance NYSE
SLM Corp. 6141 Finance NYSE
Southern Company 4911 Utilities NYSE
Southwest Airlines Co. 4512 Other NYSE
Sprint Nextel Corp. 4813 Telephone NYSE
Staples Inc. 5940 Shops NASDAQ
Starbucks Corp. 5810 Shops NASDAQ
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. 7011 Other NYSE
State Street Corp. 6022 Finance NYSE
Sysco Corp. 5140 Shops NYSE
T. Rowe Price Group Inc. 6200 Finance NASDAQ
Target Corp. 5331 Shops NYSE
Texas Instruments Inc. 3674 Business Equipment NYSE
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 6022 Finance NYSE
The Chubb Corporation 6331 Finance NYSE
The Coca-Cola Company 2080 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
The Dow Chemical Company 2821 Chemicals NYSE
The Home Depot Inc. 5211 Shops NYSE
The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. 2731 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
The TJX Companies Inc. 5651 Shops NYSE
The Travelers Companies Inc. 6331 Finance NYSE
Time Warner Cable Inc. 4841 Telephone NYSE
Time Warner Inc. 7812 Other NYSE
Tribune Co. 2711 Consumer NonDurables  NYSE
Tyco International Ltd. 7380 Other NYSE
Union Pacific Corp. 4011 Other NYSE
United Parcel Service Inc. 4210 Other NYSE
United States Steel Corp. 3312 Manufacturing NYSE
United Technologies Corp. 3724 Manufacturing NYSE
Unitedhealth Group Inc. 6324 Finance NYSE
US Bancorp 6021 Finance NYSE
Valero Energy Corp. 2911 Energy NYSE
Walgreen Co. 5912 Shops NYSE
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 5331 Shops NYSE
Walt Disney Co. 7990 Other NYSE
WellPoint Inc. 6324 Finance NYSE
Wells Fargo & Company 6021 Finance NYSE
Verizon Communications Inc. 4813 Telephone NYSE
Weyerhaeuser Co. 6798 Finance NYSE
Viacom Inc. 4841 Telephone NYSE
Williams Companies Inc. 4922 Utilities NYSE
Visa Inc. 7389 Other NYSE
Vulcan Materials Company 1400 Other NYSE
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation 7011 Other NYSE
Wynn Resorts Ltd. 7011 Other NASDAQ
Xerox Corp. 3577 Business Equipment NYSE
Xilinx Inc. 3674 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Yahoo! Inc. 7373 Business Equipment NASDAQ
Yum! Brands Inc. 5812 Shops NYSE
Zimmer Holdings Inc. 3842 Healthcare NYSE
NoDur   Consumer NonDurables Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys
          0100-0999              2700-2749 3100-3199
          2000-2399              2770-2799 3940-3989
Durbl  Consumer Durables Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances
          2500-2519              3710-3711 3750-3751 3990-3999
          2590-2599              3714-3714 3792-3792
          3630-3659              3716-3716 3900-3939
Manuf  Manufacturing Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing
          2520-2589              3200-3569 3715-3715 3830-3839
          2600-2699              3580-3629 3717-3749 3860-3899
          2750-2769              3700-3709 3752-3791
          3000-3099              3712-3713 3793-3799
Energy Energy  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products
          1200-1399              2900-2999
Chems  Chemicals Chemicals and Allied Products
          2800-2829              2840-2899
BusEq Business Equipment Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment
          3570-3579              3694-3699 7370-7379
          3660-3692              3810-3829
Telcm Telecommunications   Telephone and Television Transmission
          4800-4899
Utils Utilities Utilities
          4900-4949
Shops Shops   Wholesale, Retail, Laundries and Repair Shops
          5000-5999              7200-7299 7600-7699
Hlth Healthcare Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs
          2830-2839              3840-3859
          3693-3693              8000-8099
Finance Finance Financial sector, Banks, Insurance Companies
          6000-6999
Other  Other Mines, Constr, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment
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